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PHYSICIANS TO EACH OTHER
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I. INTRODUCTION
Four decades have passed since the "informed consent" revolution-
the recognition of a cause of action for a physician's failure to provide a pa-
tient with risk information concerning a medical procedure in conjunction
with obtaining the patient's consent to the procedure.' Now, a second
revolution in informed consent is brewing; this familiar cause of action has
begun to transform itself dramatically.
The now-traditional informed consent cause of action is well estab-
lished. It is clear that health care providers that do not adequately inform
their patients of the risks associated with medical procedures are liable for
the consequences of that failure. While there are still differing viewpoints
as to the articulation of some of the parameters of this cause of action,2 the
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IThe first serious scholarly discussion clearly advocating an informed consent cause of action is
Allan H. McCoid, A Reappraisal of Liability for Unauthorized Medical Treatment, 41 MINN. L. REV.
381,426-30 (1957). Prior to the McCoid article there was no mention of informed consent in any of the
major tort treatises. A California appellate court first coined the term "informed consent' in Salgo v.
Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 317 P.2d 170,181 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
2 Much of the debate surrounds the standards that should govern th6 determinations regarding, first,
which information should be provided and, second, whether the failure to provide this information
caused the patient harm As to the first point, in the early years of the informed consent doctrine, courts
almost exclusively used the traditional tort medical malpractice standard-the "reasonable doctor"
test-as the measure for appropriate disclosure. The case credited with giving birth to the informed
consent doctrine, Salgo, 317 P.2d at 181, was vague as to the standard of disclosure. The court said that
the physician has a duty to disclose "any facts which are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent
consent by the patient to the proposed treatment." Id. The court went on, however, to grant the physi-
cian "a certain amount of discretion" with regard to the facts to be disclosed. Beginning with Natanson
v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1960), many courts held that the standard for medical disclosure was that
which a reasonable medical doctor would provide under the circumstances. See, eg., Rush v. Miller,
648 F.2d 1075, 1076 (6th Cir. 1981); Shelter v. Rochelle, 409 P.2d 74, 86 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1965), modi-
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differences are quite small from a practical perspective.' The existence of
the informed consent cause of action has transformed medical practice. Pa-
tients are routinely given much more information about their medical deci-
sions than previously. As we have noted elsewhere, this development may
fled, 411 P.2d 45 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1966); Fuller v. Stamnes, 597 S.W.2d 88, 89 (Ark. 1980); Ditlow v.
Kaplan, 181 So. 2d 226,228 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Laurent B. Frantz, Annotation, Modern Status of
Views as to General Measure of Physician's Duty to Inform Patient of Risks of Proposed Treatment, 88
A.L.R. 3d 1008 (1978). This test almost invariably requires medical expert testimony as to what a pru-
dent doctor would tell a similarly situated patient. See, eg., Riedisser v. Nelson, 534 P.2d 1052, 1055
(Ariz. 1975); Nishi v. Hartwell, 473 P.2d 116, 121 (Haw. 1970); Casey v. Penn, 360 N.E.2d 93, 101 (III,
App. Ct. 1977); Bly v. Rhoads, 222 S.E.2d 783, 787-88 (Va. 1976). But see Leyson v. Steuermann, 705
P.2d 37 (Haw. Ct. App. 1985). See generally Daniel E. Feld, Annotation, Necessity and Sufficiency of
Expert Evidence to Establish Existence and Extent of Physician's Duty to Inform Patient of Risks of
Proposed Treatment, 52 A.L.R. 3d 1084 (1973). Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972),
changed the contours of the physician's duty to disclose material risks to the patient. Canterbury de-
fined a risk as material if a "reasonable person" in the patient's position would wish to know about it
prior to making a decision. A patient's right to information was no longer dictated by the medical pro-
fession's assessment of which risks and alternatives to treatment are worthy of consideration. Id. at 785;
see also Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676 (R.I. 1972); Miller
v. Kennedy, 522 P.2d 852 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974), aff'dper curiam, 530 P.2d 334 (Wash. 1975). For a
review of authority adopting the "reasonable patient" standard for disclosure, see Armand Arabian, In-
formed Consent: From the Ambivalence ofArato to the Thunder of Thor, 10 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 261,
263-64 n.1l (1994). As to causation, a small minority of courts have adopted a subjective causation
standard (i.e, what would this patient have decided if provided with adequate information?). See, eg.,
Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979); Arena v. Gingrich, 733 P.2d 75 (Or. Ct. App. 1987); Wil-
kinson,'295 A.2d at 690. Most courts have opted for an objective standard (i.e., what would a reason-
able patient in the patient's position have decided?). See, e.g., Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 790-91; Cobbs,
502 P.2d at 11-12; Reikes v. Martin, 471 So. 2d 385,392-93 (Miss. 1985).
3 The overwhelming preference for the reasonable patient standard in determining causation has
substantially limited the practical effect of the substantive right created by the disclosure standard. This
view is almost unanimously shared by the commentators. See, e.g., PAUL S. APPELBAUM ET AL.,
INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 122 (1987) ("By conditioning the avail-
ability of compensation on the congruence between the patient's own decision and what a so-called rea-
sonable person would have decided, the objective test undercuts a patient's right of self-determination.").
Other commentators have voiced similar criticism. See, eg., JAY KATz, THE SILENT WORLD OF
DOCTOR AND PATIENT 79-80 (1984); Richard A. Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract,
1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 87, 121 n.72 (1976) [hereinafter Medical Malpractice]; Joseph Goldstein,
For Harold Lasswell: Some Reflections on Human Dignity, Entrapment, Informed Consent, and the Plea
Bargain, 84 YALE L.J. 683, 691 (1975) [hereinafter Reflections on Human Dignity]; Leonard L. Riskin,
Informed Consent: Looking for the Action, 1975 U. ILL. L. FORUM 580, 589-90 (1975) [hereinafter
Looking for the Action]; David E. Scidelson, Lack of Informed Consent in Medical Malpractice and
Product Liability Cases: The Burden of Presenting Evidence, 14 HOFSTRA L. REv. 621, 623-24 (1986);
Marjorie Maguire Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95
YALE L.J. 219, 249-251 (1985) [hereinafter From Informed Consent to Patient Choice]; Eve R. Green
Koopersmith, Informed Consent: The Problem ofCausation, 3 MED. & L. 231 (1984). The authors of
this Article have gone beyond the traditional criticism of causation doctrine and have argued that even
the subjective test for causation is illusory. See Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, Informed Decision
Making and the Law of Torts: The Myth of Justiciable Causation, 1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 607 (1988)
[hereinafter The Myth ofJusticiable Causation].
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have increased patient autonomy," but it may affect the decisionmaking pro-
cess less than is generally assumed.
Several years ago, we suggested that a new and more robust doctrine of
informed consent was in the offing.5 We predicted that a new genre of
cases would reach the courts, and that these cases would be very different
from those that have thus far provided the staple for this type of litigation.
With the advent of more extensive gathering and comparison of data, it has
become possible to provide information to patients not only about the risks
associated with the procedures for which consent was sought, but also
about the relative risks associated with the medical providers who would
perform those procedures. At the time we made this suggestion, one state
had already published comparative provider statistics for open-heart sur-
gery, ranking performance in terms of the risk of adverse outcome by util-
izing a highly sophisticated statistical model to account for a host of risk
variables.6 Since that time, studies of a wide variety of procedures and di-
4 See The Myth of Justiciable Causation, supra note 3, at 648-64. The extent of those gains is argu-
able, however. Standardized written consent forms and risk statements for procedures and treatments
are used prevalently by all types of medical providers despite widespread concern for their comprehen-
sibility and thus for their effectiveness in eliciting truly "informed" consent. See, eg., T. M. Gnmdner,
On the Readability of Surgical Consent Forms, 302 NEW ENG. J. MED. 900 (1980) (studying five "rep-
resentative" surgical consent forms for readability, finding all five approximately equivalent to material
intended for upper-division undergraduate or graduate students, and concluding that "thousands of per-
sons may be undergoing surgery each year on the basis of inadequate consent'); Kenneth D. Hopper et
al., The Readability of Currently Used Surgical/Procedure Consent Forms in the United States, 123
SURGERY 496 (1998) (finding that while "surgical consent forms are universally used by hospitals through-
out the United States before surgery or invasive procedures," the majority of these forms "are not easily
understood" and "do not list specific benefits or potential complications of the planned sur-
gery/procedure"); Ian N. Olver et al., Impact of an Information and Consent Form on Patients Having
Chemotherapy, 162 MED. J. AUSTL. 82 (1995) (studying 100 cytoxic chemotherapy patients' under-
standing of a "plain language" information/consent form and reporting that the requirements for in-
formed consent may be too difficult to satisfy with forms written in "plain language").
5 Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, Comparing Medical Providers: A First Look at the New Era
of Medical Statistics, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 5 (1992) [hereinafter Comparing Medical Providers].
6 See Edward L. Hannan et. al., Adult Open Heart Surgery in New York State: An Analysis of Risk
Factors and Hospital Mortality Rates, 264 JAMA 2768 (1990). Statistics were also collected by the
New York State Department of Health comparing the performance of heart surgeons throughout the
state. These statistics were published in Newsday. David Zinman, Heart Surgeons Rated: State Re-
veals Patient Mortality Records, NEWSDAY, Dec. 18, 1991, at 3. For a more recent risk-adjusted study
of one particular type of open heart surgery for hospitals, see CORONARY ARTERY BYPASS SURGERY IN
NEW YORK STATE (Oct. 1998), reprinted infra Appendix A. That study also contains risk-adjusted sta-
tistics comparing the outcomes of surgeons who performed coronary bypass surgery. See infra Appen-
dix C. The risk factors for the studies of both hospital and surgeon performance in the 1990 study
included the following: age, gender, ejection fraction, previous myocardial infarction, number of open
heart operations in previous admissions, diabetes requiring medication, dialysis dependence, disasters
(acute structural defect, renal failure, cardiogenic shock, gunshot), unstable angina, intractable conges-
tive heart failure, left main trunk narrowed more than 90%, and type of operation performed. Over the
years other risk factors have been determined to be significant and are taken into account in assessing
both hospital and surgeon performance. See infra Appendix A at 7.
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agnostic categories7 have been performed for both hospitals' and physi-
cians. 9 Private organizations have also begun contributing to the growing
7 The following procedures have been used for comparison purposes in studies identified here:
coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgery, angioplasty, valve repair, coronary artery catheterization,
hip replacement, knee replacement, back surgery, colorectal resection, Cesarean-section (C-section),
vaginal birth after C-section, solid organ transplants, carotid endarterectomy, hepatic resection, abdomi-
nal hysterectomy, and gastrointestinal operations. The following patient diagnostic categories have been
used for comparison purposes in identified studies: nonsurgical heart cases (angina, heart failure and
shock, myocardial infarction), cerebrovascular accident, congestive heart failure, pneumonia, obstructive
airway disease, stroke, and gastrointestinal bleeding. For citations to studies that include these proce-
dures and diagnostic categories, see infra notes 8, 9. The New York State Health Department is consid-
ering expanding current studies to include more procedures, for example, brain surgery and childbirth
procedures. See Esther B. Fein, Surgery Survey by New YorkExpanded, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8,1997, at BI.
8 A large number of risk-adjusted studies comparing hospital performance for medical procedures
have been published. See, e.g., HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMIN., MEDICARE HOSPITAL MORTALITY
RATES (1991) (annual hardcopy report compiling Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) data
for all registered United States Medicare facilities, published annually 1987-91); MICHIGAN HEALTH &
HOSPITAL ASS'N, MICHIGAN HOSPITAL REPORT (May 1998) (compiling data from 1994-96 on coronary
bypass, valve repair, C-section, vaginal birth after C-section, nonsurgical heart care, hip replacement,
knee replacement, and groups of selected medical and surgical cases for all Michigan hospitals); NEWv
YORK STATE DEP'T OF HEALTH, ANGIOPLASTY IN NEW YORK STATE 1995 (Oct. 1997) (expanding on
the original New York bypass studies; the first study of angioplasty in 32 hospitals was released in
1997) [hereinafter NEW YORK STATE ANGIOPLASTY]; NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF HEALTH, CORONARY
ARTERY BYPASS SURGERY IN NEW YORK STATE 1994-1996 (1998) (this annual study of 31 hospitals
originated in 1989) [hereinafter NEW YORK STATE REPORT]; PENNSYLVANIA HEALTH CARE COST
CONTAINMENT COUNCIL, PENNSYLVANIA HEALTH CARE COST CONTAINMENT COUNCIL, CESAREAN
SECTION DELIVERIES IN PENNSYLVANIA, 1995 (1997); PENNSYLVANIA'S GUIDE TO CORONARY ARTERY
BYPASS GRAFT SURGERY (May 1997) (annual study of 43 hospitals modeled on New York's program
began in 1992) [hereinafter PENNSYLVANIA CONTAINMENT COUNCIL]; Jennifer Daley et al., Risk Ad-
justment of the Postoperative Morbidity Rate for the Comparative Assessment of the Quality of Surgical
Care: Results of the National Veterans Affairs Surgical Risk Study, 185 J. AM. C. SURGEONS 328
(1997) (comparing outcomes of 87,078 major noncardiac operations at 44 Veterans Affairs facilities
identified by number); Ciaran S. Phibbs et al., The Effects of Patient Volume and Level of Care at the
Hospital of Birth on Neonatal Mortality, 276 JAMA 1054 (1996) (comparing neonatal mortality rates
for births at nonfederal California hospitals in 1990 and reporting mortality and birth weight outcomes
for subgroups of hospitals which provide "Level I," "Level II," or "Level III" neonatal care); Michael
Pine et al., Predictions of Hospital Mortality Rates: A Comparison of Data Sources, 126 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 347 (1997) (comparing use of risk-adjusted administrative outcome data versus clinical
data at 30 acute care hospitals for the following four diagnostic categories: myocardial infarction, cere-
brovascular accident, congestive heart failure, or pneumonia); Leslie L. Roos et al., Postsurgical Mor-
tality in Manitoba and New England, 263 JAMA 2453 (1990) (comparing outcome data for 11
procedures, including bypass and hip replacement, at New England Medicare hospitals and Manitoba
hospitals, and reporting 30-day and 60-day mortality rate by hospital region); Gary E. Rosenthal et al.,
Severity-Adjusted Mortality and Length of Stay in Teaching and Nonteaching Hospitals: Results of a
Regional Study, 278 JAMA 485 (1997) (comparing outcome data for six diagnostic categories, including
stroke, heart attack, congestive heart failure, pneumonia, gastrointestinal bleeding, and obstructive air-
way disease, for 30 hospitals in northeast Ohio); J. H. Siber et al., The Relationship Between Choice of
Outcome Measure and Hospital Rank in General Surgical Procedures: Implications for Quality As-
sessment, 9 INT'L. J. QUALITY HEALTH CARE 193 (1997) (comparing three types of outcome measure
rankings, including "case-mix" and severity-adjusted mortality rate ranking, complication rate ranking,
and 'ailure-to-rescue" rankings for 142 hospitals based on 74,647 patients who underwent general sur-
gical procedures); Gastrointestinal Surgery Safer at Major Hospitals (visited May 27, 1998)
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number of studies."0 We predicted that it was only a matter of time before
plaintiffs would utilize the existence of such statistics in informed consent
litigation by arguing that they would not have agreed to undergo a proce-
dure with a "riskier" physician had they been aware that a physician with a
better track record was available. In Johnson v. Kokemoor," discussed in
Part II, the Wisconsin Supreme Court proved our prediction correct. The
case is certain to take on landmark status, heralding the second revolution in
informed consent law.
In the ensuing pages we argue that "comparative provider" cases, al-
though new and revolutionary, are in fact theoretically more sound and prac-
tically easier to resolve than traditional informed consent cases that focus
on comparing the risks of alternative modes of treatment. In Parts III and
<http'J/nytsyn.com/imds> (reporting on study comparing outcome data for gastrointestinal operations at
51 Maryland hospitals from 1990-94).
9 See, e.g., NEW JERSEY DEP'T OF HEALTH AND SENIOR SERVICES, CORONARY ARTERY BYPASS
GRAFT SURGERY IN NEW JERSEY 1994-1995 (Nov. 1997) (reporting mortality rate data for bypass sur-
geries by name); NEW YORK STATE REPORT, supra note S (reporting mortality rate data for surgeons by
name since the studies began in 1989); NEW YORK STATE ANGIOPLASTY, supra note 8; PENNSYLVANIA
CONTAINMENT COUNcIL, supra note 8 (reporting mortality rate data for bypass surgeons by name); G.P.
Copeland et al., Risk-A diusted Analysis of Surgeon Performance: A 1-Year Study, 82 BRIT. J. SURGERY
408 (1995) (reporting mortality rates as compared to expected mortality rates for each surgeon, identi-
fied by code letters, performing "non-day-case general surgery" at a single English hospital); J. Donald
Easton & David G. Sherman, Stroke and Mortality Rate in Carotid Endarterectomy: 228 Consecutive
Operations, 8 STROKE 565 (1977) (comparing stroke and mortality rates for 228 carotid endarterecto-
mies by 11 surgeons at two Illinois hospitals); Peter M. Sagar et al., Comparison of Individual Surgeon's
Performance: Risk-Adjusted Analysis With POSSUM Scoring System, 39 DIS. COLON & RECrUM 654
(1996) (comparing morbidity and mortality rates for 438 colorectal resections by each of five surgeons
identified by code letters).
1o Private organizations are increasingly joining the cottage industry growing out of medical pro-
vider statistics. Privately compiled studies geared toward the consumer market are published, often on
the Interet, by these organizations for direct profit or as marketing tools for a particular provider's
services. See, eg., Center for the Study of Services, Consumer Hospital Guide (visited June 18, 1998)
<http'J/www.checkbook.org> (providing website database where, for a subscription fee, consumers can
search for provider/outcome data, including risk-adjusted mortality and complication rates for nine dif-
ferent procedures and patient diagnostic categories for U.S. acute care facilities); Cleveland Clinic
Foundation, How to Choose a Doctor and Hospital (visited June 20, 1998) <http://www.ccf. org> (pub-
lishing provider statistics for Cleveland Clinic centers on cardiac catheterization angioplasty, CABG,
and retropubic prostatectomy and providing references for studies on outcome rates for similar proce-
dures at other facilities for consumer comparison purposes); Mediqual Systems, Inc., e-Book (visited
July 5, 1998) <http://www.mediqual.com> (website report providing mortality and complication rate data
for heart attack patients, hip replacement surgery, knee replacement surgery, and stroke patients at all
registered Medicare acute care facilities); Report From the Field: Cardiology Networks'Using Mortality
Rates as Marketing Device, 18 MED. OUTCOMES & GUIDELINES ALERT, Sept. 16, 1993, available in
WL 3091644, (database reporting that two not-for-profit national networks of cardiologists and cardio-
vascular surgeons have banded together to sell their services on the strength of members' demonstrated
low mortality rates and high performance volume for heart surgeries, including CABG and angioplasty; one
service, the National Cardiovascular Network, claimed 700 physician members from 40 facilities).
n 545 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1996). For an interesting discussion of Kokemoor, see Richard A. Heine-
mann, Note, Pushing the Limits of Informed Consent: Johnson v. Kokemoor and Physician-Specified
Disclosure, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 1079 (1997).
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IV, we demonstrate that a host of causation issues that render traditional in-
formed consent cases problematic are not problematic at all in the context
of a comparative provider case. Thus, we propose that as part of the in-
formed consent doctrine, courts recognize a cause of action for a physi-
cian's failure to give patients provider-risk information.
Having established that comparative provider statistics can support a
robust informed choice case against an individual medical provider, we turn
in Part V to the role that comparative provider statistics should play in the
world of managed health care. This is an important context for application
of our theory, both because of the increased role managed care organiza-
tions play in health care decisions and because of the unique relationship
such organizations have to their patients. We conclude that managed care
organizations, with access to massive amounts of information about their
providers, may have an obligation to deliver provider-specific information
to patients and that failure to deliver that information may leave them open
to informed consent lawsuits.
II. OPENING THE DOOR TO COMPARATIVE PROVIDER
LITIGATION: JOHNSON V. KOKEMOOR
The facts of Johnson v. Kokemoor provide a good starting point for our
analysis. Donna Johnson went to see Dr. Richard Kokemoor, a neurologist
and neurosurgeon in Chippewa Falls, Wisconsin, to determine the cause of
her headaches. After reviewing computed tomography (CT) scans, Dr. Ko-
kemoor determined that Johnson had an enlarged aneurysm at the rear of
her brain and recommended surgery to clip the aneurysm. After some dis-
closure about the risks of this procedure, Johnson agreed to have Dr. Ko-
kemoor perform it. The surgery did not go well; as a result of the surgery,
Johnson was rendered an incomplete quadriplegic, unable to walk or to
control her bowel and bladder movements.
Johnson eschewed bringing an action for negligent performance of the
surgery.'2 Instead, she brought an action based on informed consent, pre-
senting evidence that Dr. Kokemoor had substantially understated the mag-
nitude of the risks of basal aneurysm surgery. In addition, the trial court
admitted evidence that Kokemoor had failed to (1) divulge the extent of his
experience in performing this type of surgery, (2) compare the morbidity
and mortality rates for this type of surgery performed by experienced sur-
geons with the rates for inexperienced surgeons like himself, and (3) refer
12 The decision by plaintiffs counsel not to bring an action for negligent performance of the surgery
served to blunt the defendant's argument that the plaintiff sought to transform a duty to reasonably in-
form the patient into a duty to reasonably perform the surgery even though no proof that the surgery was
actually negligently performed had been presented. See Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d at 504. The Court re-jected the defendant's argument, noting that "while a jury might confuse negligent failure to disclose
with negligent treatment, the likelihood of confusion is nonexistent or de minimis in this case. The
plaintiff dismissed her negligent treatment claim before trial." Id. at 506.
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the plaintiff to a tertiary care center staffed by physicians more experienced
in performing the surgery.
Essentially, plaintiff's experts testified that master neurosurgeons had
reported a morbidity and mortality rate of 10.7% when operating upon basilar
bifurcation aneurysms comparable in size to that of the plaintiff, but that the
rate for inexperienced surgeons such as the defendant would be "closer to
the thirty percent range." 3 The plaintiff's experts further testified that a
reasonable physician in the defendant's position would have advised the
plaintiff of the existence of more experienced surgeons and would have re-
ferred her to them and to a hospital such as the Mayo Clinic, which had su-
perior facilities and expertise in this type of surgery.
The defendant argued that the evidence comparing the risks associated
with the procedure if performed by him with the risks of the same proce-
dure if performed by other surgeons could not support a cause of action. He
contended that the court should limit the informed consent doctrine to dis-
closures relating to significant complications of the proposed procedure.
Failure to respect this limit, Dr. Kokemoor argued, would lead a jury to di-
vert its attention from a consideration of whether the defendant made re-
quired disclosures regarding treatment to whether he had acted reasonably
in performing the surgery. Allowing the plaintiff to base an informed con-
sent claim on evidence concerning the relative risk associated with the pro-
cedure as performed by Dr. Kokemoor could, he argued, easily lead a jury
to base its decision on an inference of negligent treatment, even though the
plaintiff would not be required to demonstrate that the surgery was negli-
gently performed. 4
In a sharply worded opinion, Justice Abrahamson rejected the defen-
dant's position. She found no warrant in Wisconsin law for a "bright line"
rule limiting the informed consent doctrine to information relating to risks
associated with the procedure itself; both Kokemoor's lack of experience
and relative competence were highly relevant to whether Johnson had re-
ceived adequate information to make an informed choice. Justice Abra-
hamson noted that Dr. Kokemoor had admitted that he had a duty to reveal
the general risks associated with a particular surgery. Assuming that the
general risk of paralysis is ten percent but climbs to forty percent when per-
formed by a relatively inexperienced surgeon, Justice Abrahamson stated
that "[ilt defies logic to ... requir[e] ... the first, almost meaningless sta-
tistic to be divulged to a patient while the second, far more relevant statistic
should not be."'5
13 Id. at 499.
14 See supra note 12.
Is Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d at 507. In Duttry v. Lewis Patterson, M.D., 1999 WL 787656, *2 (Pa.
Super. Ct.), the court relied on Kokemoor to find that a physician who had overstated his experience in
performing esophageal surgery could be held liable for failing to obtain informed consent. The court
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At the close of its opinion, the court took note of Dr. Kokemoor's
contention that Johnson had offered no evidence that his failure to disclose
his relevant experience had caused her harm, given that "even had the sur-
gery been performed by a 'master,' a bad result may have occurred." 6 In a
somewhat Delphic paragraph, the court noted that causation in an informed
consent case is established when a jury finds that a "reasonable person in
the patient's position would have arrived at a different decision about the
treatment or surgery had he or she been fully informed of the risks and ad-
vantages of surgery."1 It is clear, though, that the court understood that the
defendant was pressing a somewhat different point. The defendant had ar-
gued that even if the plaintiff had chosen a master surgeon, a significant re-
siduum of risk for basilar aneurysm surgery was present." To this, the
court responded that if the defendant was dissatisfied with the standard cau-
sation instruction in a case involving provider-specific evidence, he had not
fully developed this contention in the court below."
The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings con-
sistent with the opinion. Prior to retrial, the parties settled. It is not clear
from the Wisconsin Supreme Court opinion whether the defendant would
have been free to raise his injury causation argument on remand. As we
shall see, given that damages were not determined in the lower court, it is
certainly possible that the lower court would have entertained defendant's
causation argument in the damage assessment phase of the case. But that is
getting ahead of the story. First, let us turn to a rigorous analysis of pro-
vider-specific informed consent, and in particular to a comparison with a
traditional informed consent case grounded on failure to provide informa-
tion about risks associated with a particular treatment.
IIm. COMPARING "TRADITIONAL" INFORMED CONSENT CASES WITH
PROVIDER-SPECIFIC INFORMED CONSENT CASES
A. The Weak Causal Link in Traditional Cases
The elements of a traditional informed consent case, based on the failure
of a physician to provide a patient with information concerning the relative
risks of a given procedure and the possible alternative modes of therapy, pre-
noted that the patient had inquired about the physician's experience and limited its holding to cases
where a direct inquiry was made of the physician.
" Id. at 509.
17 Id. at 509-10.
18 The defendant's argument that the identical injury could have occurred at the hands of a master
surgeon goes to the issue of "injury causation." See infra text accompanying note 23. The instruction
that the court approved went to the issue of "decision causation." See infra text accompanying notes 20-
22. Nonetheless, the court was aware that the defendant's argument was directed toward "injury causa-
tion." In Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d at 509 n.36, the court referred to the discussion of this very issue that
appears in Comparing Medical Providers, supra note 5, at 32.
'9 See Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d at 510.
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sent substantial obstacles to recovery for an aggrieved patient. Even assum-
ing that a patient can establish that information regarding material risk was
withheld, two difficult causation questions stand as barriers to recovery.
The first causation question concerns "decision causation." In most ju-
risdictions, in order to demonstrate that she did not give informed consent
to a procedure, a plaintiff is required to establish that a hypothetical "rea-
sonable patient" supplied with the desired information would have chosen
against the procedure recommended by the physician.20 But if the recom-
mended procedure was so risky in comparison to its potential rewards that
most reasonable patients would decline it, recommending the procedure
was almost certainly negligence. Thus, a straightforward cause of action
for negligent treatment would ensue rather than one for informed consent,
which would be superfluous.
By contrast, a "pure" informed consent case (that is, one independent
of a negligence claim) presupposes that the physician has acted reasonably
in choosing the recommended treatment. In such a context,'though, it is
very difficult to establish decision causation. After all, reasonable patients
generally follow the nonnegligent recommendations of their reasonable
doctors. To prove decision causation, however, the patient would have to
show that she would have made the opposite decision-to decline the rec-
ommended treatment." It matters little that this causation requirement un-
dercuts the goal of patient autonomy which is the desideratum of a rule
requiring the physician to share with the patient information regarding ma-
terial risks. That argument has been made ad nauseam with little success."
A patient must establish "decision causation" or else the action will fail.
A second causation problem--"injury causation"--is also operative in
cases in which the claim is that the patient was provided with inadequate in-
formation about a medical procedure. This problem concerns whether the
patient's decision to undergo the procedure caused any harm in comparison
to the choice that otherwise would have been made. With the exception,
perhaps, of cosmetic surgery, a decision not to undertake a procedure, or to
undergo an alternate form of treatment, will itself present substantial risks.
Thus, this causation question requires analysis of the risks of the course of
20 See sources cited supra note 2.
21 See Looldng for the Action, supra note 3, at 589-90; From Informed Consent to Patient Choice,
supra note 3, at 249-50.
22 See sources cited supra note 3. See also The Myth of Justiciable Causation, supra note 3, where
the authors observe:
In the pre-Canterbury era, courts established a narrower objective test for materiality ("rea-
sonable doctor") and a broad-based test for causation ("subjective patient"). Canterbury appears
to be a mirror image of the older case law. It created a broad test for materiality ("reasonable pa-
tient") and a narrower objective test for causation (what a "reasonable patient" would have cho-
sen). Since the causation test is tied to the choice of a "reasonable patient" and such patients are
usually heavily influenced by medical recommendations, the causation test is very much governed
by a professional standard.
Id. at 61Sn. 3.
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treatment that the patient would have chosen (whether a different therapy or
no therapy at all) had the withheld information been given.' Indeed, if the
physician's recommendation was a reasonable one, it is likely that the risk
of harm associated with a course of action different than that recommended
by the physician would have been equal to or greater than that associated
with the recommended course of action.
How, then, was the patient harmed? If the patient had chosen the al-
ternate course of action, her risk of harm would likely have been no less.u
23 See Medical Malpractice, supra note 3, at 121-25; From Informed Consent to Patient Choice, su-
pra note 3, at 288-91. Even with regard to decision causation, the problem of communicating risk in
comparative terms is difficult. See Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE, L.J. 899,
948-51 (1994) [hereinafter Rethinking Informed Consent]. Schuck's discussion focuses on uni-
dimensional risk coparison. He argues:
To make risk information more meaningful to patients, physicians need not transform their
self-conceptions or roles, nor incur new time or other costs; they need only to change how they de-
scribe risk to patients. Suppose that physicians were to characterize risks to patients not in one of
the absolute, more or less quantitative forms mentioned above but rather (or in addition) in explic-
itly comparative terms---that is, in terms that encourage the patient to assess the medical risk in
light of other risks that are more familiar to her, risks that she has some basis for, and experience
in, evaluating. For example, the physician might compare the medical risk to the risk of certain
types of common accidents or other adverse outcomes (eg., collisions from driving at night, lung
cancer from smoking, complications from drinking alcohol while pregnant) about which patients
are more accustomed to appraising and making explicit or implicit choices.
Id. at 949. The next step in decision causation is to provide patients with comparative-risk assessment
between different medical procedures. Only after decision causation has been decided favorably for a
plaintiff does a court confront the problem of assessing damages for the differential between the risk of
the procedure recommended by the physician and chosen by the patient and the risk presented by the
alternative procedure that the patient would have chosen.
24 Tort damages generally measure the differential or add on caused by the tortious conduct as com-
pared with nontortious conduct. Valuing the differential requires a risk assessment of the alternative that
the patient would have chosen. For the most part, such assessments are either unknown or unknowable.
Placing a monetary value on the differential is simply not feasible. The analogy to "increased harm"
arising out of products liability "crashworthiness" litigation is compelling. To successfully prosecute a
crashworthiness case, plaintiff must establish that she suffered damages beyond that which would have
resulted had the product been free from defect. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 16(a)-(b) (1998). For extensive case law supporting this rule, see Id., Reporters' Note at
241-54. Where proof supports the amount of increased harm caused by the product defect, damages are
limited to that amount. When plaintiff is only able to demonstrate that the defect was a substantial fac-
tor in causing increased harm but cannot quantify the differential, the majority of cases impose damages
for all the harm suffered by plaintiff on the product seller.
With reference to injury causation in informed consent cases, there is no case law addressing the in-
creased harm question. Scholars have addressed the problem. See, e.g., Jon R. Waltz & Thomas W.
Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U. L. REV. 628, 646-49 (1969). According to
Waltz and Scheuneman, the proper damages are reflected by "the difference between ... [the patient's]
condition with no treatment and his condition after the undisclosed risk materialized." Id. at 649. Pro-
fessor Richard Epstein concurs. He argues:
The second causal question raised in informed consent cases concerns what might have
happened to the patient if appropriate disclosures had led him to refuse the proposed treatment.
While it might be tempting to hold the physician responsible for the harm caused by the treatment,
that position is quite unsound if it does not take into account the harm that would have occurred in
any event. In tort actions for harm caused to strangers, the plaintiff's pre-existing condition is usu-
ally not an issue, since such plaintiffis normally ofsound mind and body. In those cases where he
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The answer, of course, is that the harm consists of not only the physical in-jury, but also the fact that the patient was deprived of her autonomy. The
problem here, however, is to evaluate hard tort damages which flow from
the deprivation of autonomy occasioned by the failure to provide the patient
with adequate information.25 One cannot blithely assume that the right to
patient autonomy is to be valued by the damages the patient actually suf-
fered from the undertaken procedure. Autonomy is an independent interest
with an independent value. 6
B. The Causal Link Will Typically Be Stronger in Cases
Concerning Provider-Specific Information
As explained above, there are serious conceptual and factual weak-
nesses in cases in which the information withheld from the patient is infor-
mation about the risks associated with the procedure itself (independent of
the provider). These weaknesses are absent, however, from cases in which
the nondisclosed information concerns the risks associated with the par-
ticular provider. Indeed, as this section will demonstrate, the causal link
between the omitted information and the injury in cases involving provider-
specific information is much more likely to be susceptible of credible proof.
The decision causation aspect of these cases (unlike traditional cases con-
cerning risks associated with a medical procedure) will typically be quite
strong, and the injury causation question, while not without its difficulties,
will be more readily subject to credible and coherent resolution.
The decision causation question inherent in an informed consent claim
can be articulated clearly: would the patient have made the decision to go
forward had the omitted information been disclosed? As demonstrated ear-
is not, the accepted view, whenever apportionment is possible, is to allow recovery only for the
additional harm that was caused by the tortfeasor's conduct and not for the total amount of harm
experienced thereafter. For those patients (doubtless a significant proportion) who were nothealthy at the outset of treatment, their precarious condition carries with it the substantial risk offurther harm if prompt corrective steps are not taken. We are not talking of remote or speculativeposs'bilities. In the medical context the possible reduction in damages required by the application
of the rule is likely to be substantial in many cases and total in others.
Medical Malpractice supra note 3, at 121-22 (footnotes omitted). One might draw an analogy to the
crashworthiness cases and allow a plaintiff who has proved some increased harm to recover full damages
unless the defendant introduces credible evidence to specify the increased harm. See RESTATEMENT(THMRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABELrry § 16(c) (1998). However, a plaintiff would still be required to
prove that the harm actually suffered is greater than the harm that would have taken place if the alterna-
tive therapy had been chosen. Furthermore, a defendant would be free to introduce evidence that the
risks of the alternative therapy were significant and should be considered in reducing the damages.
25 For a full discussion of this issue, see The Myth ofJusticiable Causation, supra note 3, at 620-21.26 See id. at 648-49. It should be noted that under any theory of informed consent, a patient is freeto exercise her autonomy and refuse information that a physician would otherwise be obligated to pro-
vide. Thus, a physician would have a duty to disclose to a patient that comparative provider risk infor-
mation is available and that the physician is willing to provide it to the patient. As with risks associated
with procedures, if a patient indicates to the physician that she does not want to know about the com-
parative provider risk information, the physician would have no duty to insist that the patient listen to
the information. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d(4)(b) (McKinney 1993).
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lier, when the omitted information concerns the inherent risks of the proce-
dure, it is difficult in most cases for a nonidiosyncratic patient to demonstrate
credibly that she would have declined a procedure that it was reasonable for
the provider to have recommended. After all, this traditional form of in-
formed consent action is bounded on one side by malpractice2" and on the
other by triviality.s For the patient to prevail in a case that lies between
those boundaries-that is, with respect to a procedure that is reasonable for
the provider to select and recommend, but also risky enough that a reason-
able patient might decline it-proof of decision causation is an uphill battle.
In this narrow band of close cases, it is simply difficult to demonstrate
credibly that the patient would, in fact, have declined to undergo the rea-
sonably recommended procedure.
When the omitted information concerns risks associated with the par-
ticular provider, however, the decision causation element can be demon-
strated credibly in a wide variety of cases. In these cases, the question is
not whether the patient would have consented to the procedure in question
(as opposed to some other procedure with a different risk matrix, or as op-
posed to the risk of undergoing no procedure at all). Rather, the question is
whether the patient would have consented to the procedure to be performed
by this provider with this provider's level of risk, as opposed to being per-
formed by another provider with that provider's lower level of risk. Dis-
putes concerning the identity of the provider do not, by their nature,
necessarily inhabit the same narrow bounds as cases concerning the proce-
dure itself. Rather, decision causation in this context can, and often will, be
in the realm of "easy" cases."
For example, let us imagine a case not unlike Kokemoor. Assume that
it is uncontested that the patient needs a particular, relatively risky surgical
procedure. Assume further that the risk associated with the procedure is not
invariable, but rather highly dependent on the experience of the surgeon
performing the procedure-that is, the risk of adverse outcome is signifi-
cantly higher when the procedure is performed by a surgeon who encoun-
ters the procedure only occasionally, but is much lower when performed by
27 Recommending a procedure that is unreasonable under the circumstances is itself malpractice,
without regard to disclosure of risks.
28 In the case of a procedure that has such low risk that no reasonable patient would decline it be-
cause of that risk, failure to disclose that risk violates no duty and, in any event, would not have influ-
enced the patient's decision. See supra note 2.
But see Mary Anne Bobinski, Autonomy & Privacy: Protecting Patients from Their Physicians,
55 U. PITT. L. REV. 291, 343 (1994) [hereinafter Autonomy & Privacy]. The author notes that in an in-
formed consent case, a plaintiff must first establish whether a risk is material and should have been
communicated to the patient. Id. The jurisdictions are split as to whether the test for materiality is the
"reasonable doctor" or reasonable patient test. See discussion supra note 2. Bobinski argues that in
states adhering to the "reasonable doctor" standard, it will be more difficult to establish that reasonable
physicians would have revealed "provider-associated" risks. However, she acknowledges that even in
states following this more conservative approach, the barrier to recovery is not insuperable. See Auton-
omy & Privacy, at 343-44 n.188.
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a surgeon who performs the procedure regularly.30 In such a case, it hardly
strains credulity to believe that a patient, having been informed of this risk
differential, would have opted for the more experienced physician and the
accompanying lower level of risk. While in any particular case other fac-
tors might influence the patient's decision (availability and cost of the more
experienced surgeon, the patient's relationship with the riskier surgeon,
etc.), there is little reason to be inherently skeptical of the statement, "Had I
been made aware that I could have had the same procedure performed by a
different provider with a much smaller risk of adverse outcome, I would
have chosen that provider instead of the one who performed the procedure."
Thus, in the case of omitted information about the provider, the pa-
tient's burden-to demonstrate that, if fully informed about the level of
risk, she would have selected a different provider-does not entail demon-
strating anything unusual about the patient. For the patient to argue that she
would have chosen the less risky way to pursue health is simply to argue
30 Studies consistently show an inverse relation between volume of procedures performed per pro-
vider (or of patients treated in a single diagnostic category) and adverse outcome rates (as measured by
risk-adjusted mortality or complication rates), no matter what procedure is studied, and thus suggest that
"practice makes proficiency." Don Colbum, Practice Makes Proficiency in Bypass Surgery, Study Says,
WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 1997, at WH-5 (describing study of 274 cardiac surgeons in New York, Pennsyl-
vania, and Wisconsin that reveals significantly lower mortality rates for cardiac surgeons performing
higher numbers of bypass surgeries). See also Autonomy & Privacy, supra note 29, at 296 n.9 (reporting
that "studies regularly indicate that success rates for heart transplants are better at institutions where
more transplants have been performed"). Studies showing such risk-adjusted inverse volume/adverse
outcome rates for hospital providers are numerous. See, eg., Edward L. Hannan et al., Coronary Angio-
plasty Volume-Outcome Relationships for Hospitals and Cardiologists, 277 JAMA 892 (1997) (finding
that in percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasties (PTCA) performed in the state of New York,
both hospital volume and cardiologist volume are significantly inversely related to risk-adjusted mortal-
ity rates); Robert G. Hughes et al., Hospital Volume and Patient Outcomes: The Case of Hip Fracture
Patients, 26 MED. CARE 1057 (1988) (finding that hip fracture patients achieve better mortality and
complication rate outcomes at those hospitals, out of the 704 U.S. hospitals studied that treat larger
numbers of such patients); Hans J. Kreder et al., Relationship Between the Volume of Total Hip Re-
placements Performed by Providers and the Rates of Postoperative Complications in the State of
Washington, 79-A J. BONE & JOINT SURGERY 485 (1997) (finding a significant relationship between
surgeons averaging fewer than two hip replacements annually and higher adverse outcome, as measured
by rates of mortality, infection, revision surgery, and complications); Stephen E. Kimmel et al., The Re-
lationship Between Coronary Angioplasty Procedure Volume and Major Complications, 274 JAMA
1137 (1995) (finding significant decrease in complication and mortality rates with increasing volume of
percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty procedures performed at 48 provider centers and stating
that "an inverse association between the number of CABG surgeries performed at a hospital and subse-
quent mortality rates has been well described ... "); Mark A. Mattos et al., Evolution of Carotid Endar-
terectomy in Two Community Hospitals: Springfield Revisited-Seventeen Years and 2243 Operations
Later, 21 J. VASCULAR SURGERY 719,722 (1995) (reporting that "operative stroke rate of [31] surgeons
who performed more than 12 CEAs per year was significantly lower than [rates of those surgeons who
performed less than one CEA per month]" and that mortality rates were similar); Ciaran S. Phibbs et al.,
The Effects of Patient Volume and Level of Care at the Hospital of Birth on Neonatal Mortality, 276
JAMA 1054 (1996) (finding correlation between volume of high-risk neonatal cases treated at all non-
federal California hospitals in 1990 and risk-adjusted mortality rates).
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that she is a risk-averse, utility-maximizing actor-exactly the assumption
on which most of law and life are based.
In sum, in cases in which it is reasonable (that is, not malpractice itself)
to recommend that the patient undergo a procedure, information concerning
the relative level of risk associated with the provider of the procedure is
much more likely to influence a nonidiosyncratic patient than is information
about the relative risk of the procedure itself. Thus, the decision causation
element of the informed consent action will more often be credibly fulfilled
when the omitted information concerns the provider rather than the proce-
dure.3'
The injury causation element of an informed consent case based on un-
disclosed information about the provider is quite interesting. At one level,
this element will be easier to demonstrate than in a typical informed consent
case (in which the omitted information concerns the procedure rather than
the provider). At another level, however, the case for injury causation is
very challenging. For a patient to be harmed by a breach of a duty means
that the patient is somehow worse off than if the duty had been fulfilled. As
demonstrated above, in a traditional, pure informed consent case-in which
recommending the procedure was not itself malpractice and the omitted in-
formation concerned the risks associated with the procedure-determining
whether a patient is, in fact, in a worse situation as a result of the procedure
(even with its adverse outcome) can be a daunting task. After all, we know
what happened as a result of undergoing the procedure, but we don't know
what to compare that result to. Would the patient have chosen no treatment,
or an alternative procedure? Which alternative (and perhaps riskier) proce-
dure would the patient have selected? Would the possible harm associated
with the alternative procedure (or with no treatment at all) have occurred?
Because the answers to those questions are, in most cases, unavailable, the
comparison between the patient's actual condition resulting from the proce-
dure chosen and the patient's hypothetical condition resulting from a differ-
ent choice is impossible.
31 In the case where the disparity between providers is very great, one might bring an action for
negligence against the provider for having undertaken to perform the procedure at all. This possibility is
explored in Comparing Medical Providers, supra note 5, at 13-26. If negligence were established, a
plaintiff would face the problem of proving that the negligence of the provider did, in fact, cause her
harm. Since adverse results occur even in the hands ofrmore skilled providers, the plaintiff would have
to establish that the negligence of the physician in undertaking to perform the surgery was the actual
cause of her injury. It would probably be necessary to resort to proportional causation to credibly assess
damages. It is clear, however, that the informed consent cause of action is the preferred route for a
plaintiff in prosecuting a comparative-provider cause of action. It is more difficult to establish that a
provider who is licensed, and often board-certified, is negligent for undertaking to perform surgery
within the physician's formal expertise. Furthermore, a plaintiff making a "negligent undertaking" ar-
gument would be faced with the argument of the defendant in Kokemoor that ajury will confuse "negli-
gent undertaking" with "negligent performance." That argument was blunted in Kokemoor because the
plaintiff did not prosecute a negligence claim and instead pursued only her cause of action for informed
consent. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
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Where the issue relates to comparative provider statistics, however, the
search for a way to assess the differential in the causation context will not
be in vain. In cases involving provider-specific information, the causation
question has fewer variables. Having resolved the decision causation issue,
we are confident in our conclusion as to what the patient would have done
had the information been disclosed: the patient would have undergone the
same treatment, but with a different provider. We are also confident of the
alternative outcome with which we are comparing the unfortunate outcome
of the actual procedure: successful performance of the procedure. The re-
maining variable, though, is a large one: would the procedure, as performed
by the alternative provider, actually have resulted in a successful outcome?
Th& answer to that question is a resounding "maybe."
IV. INJURY CAUSATION AND "LOST CHANCE"
How should the legal system deal with this "maybe"? After all, even
the alternate provider, who has a better success rate than the provider who
performed the procedure, does not likely have a 100% success rate. Thus,
the patient might have suffered the same adverse result even if the proce-
dure had been performed by the alternate provider. 2 But while the patient
might have suffered harm as a result of utilizing the services of the alternate
provider, she also might have suffered no harm at all.33
One response to the "maybe," ultimately not very satisfying, is simply
to observe that the legal system does not require certainty. In a civil law-
suit, a plaintiff is not required to prove that the defendant's action definitely
caused the plaintiff's injury; all that the plaintiff is required to demonstrate
is that it is more likely than not that the injury was caused by that action. 4
Of course, in an informed consent case, the question is more hypothetical.
The question is not whether the defendant's actions are causally connected
32 Of course, if lower risks are associated with many providers other than the defendant, we must
determine which such provider is the "alternate provider." The answer is the provider that the patient,
armed with adequate information, would have chosen. Whether this provider is the least risky provider
might well depend on factors other than the risk identified in the decision causation analysis. See supra
text accompanying note 30.
33 For the purpose of this portion of the discussion, we are assuming that only a patient who has suf-
fered an adverse outcome will bring an informed consent action based on provider-specific information.
An argument can be made that even a patient who does not suffer an adverse outcome nonetheless suf-
fers a dignitary harm when a provider does not provide the appropriate information in obtaining the pa-
tient's consent to treatment. See generally The Myth of Justiciable Causation, supra note 3.
34 Strictly speaking, the plaintiff's entire factual claim, not merely each element of it, must be dem-
onstrated at this more-likely-than-not standard. See, eg., The Myth of Justiciable Causation, supra note
3, at 644; Medical Malpractice, supra note 3, at 125-26. For simplicity of calculation and exposition,
however, this Article assumes that the injury causation element of the plaintiff's claim is satisfied if that
element is demonstrated at the more-likely-than-not level. The analysis can easily be adjusted to ac-
count for this slight simplification. As to probability theory and burdens of persuasion generally, see,
e.g., Neil B. Cohen, Confidence in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a World of Imperfect Knowl-
edge, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 385 (1985) [hereinafter Confidence in Probability].
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to the plaintiffs injury-that is a given. Rather, the question is whether the
patient would have suffered the same injury had the patient had the same
procedure performed by the alternative provider instead.
Nonetheless, even this hypothetical comparison need not always be
troubling. Assume that the defendant has a five-percent success rate with re-
spect to the procedure in question-that is, ninety-five percent of the time the
procedure, when performed by the defendant, has an adverse outcome. Fur-
ther assume that the alternate provider has a ninety-five-percent success rate
with respect to that procedure-that is, the adverse outcome occurs in only
five percent of cases. Finally, assume that the plaintiff underwent the proce-
dure performed by the defendant (who should have, but did not, disclose this
relative risk information to the plaintiff) and that the adverse outcome oc-
curred. It does not take sophisticated mathematics to conclude that it is
more likely than not that, had the alternative provider performed the proce-
dure, the adverse outcome would not have occurred.
What should the legal system do, however, if the relative success rates
are twenty percent for the defendant and thirty percent for the alternative
provider?3" In this case, even the alternate provider has adverse outcomes
in seventy percent of cases. It would be difficult or impossible to conclude
that injury causation has been proven to the preponderance standard-that
is, we cannot honestly say that it is more likely than not that, had the plain-
tiff gone to the alternate provider, the injury would not have occurred. In
fact, even if the plaintiff had gone to the alternate provider, it is more likely
than not that the plaintiff would have suffered the same adverse outcome.
Does this mean that the plaintiff should lose this case, even though the
defendant failed to disclose information that there was a duty to disclose
and the failure to disclose caused the plaintiff to choose the defendant to
perform the procedure? This result would certainly be distasteful. After all,
the defendant breached a duty, the plaintiff suffered an injury, and, had
there been no breach, the plaintiff s probability of escaping the adverse out-
come would have been higher. As one court so aptly put it: "A patient with
cancer.., would pay to have a choice between three unmarked doors-be-
hind two of which were death, with life the third option. A physician who
deprived the patient of this opportunity, even though only a one-third chance,
would have caused her real harm."36
If one does not find this argument persuasive in the context of an indi-
vidual case, consider a situation in which the defendant fails to disclose this
information to a large number of patients-say, one hundred. Eighty of
35 For purposes of this example, it is assumed that this difference would have been enough to cause
the plaintiff, had the relative risk information been disclosed, to choose the alternative provider. This
assumption might not be true for a procedure with respect to which the adverse outcome is relatively
minor, but certainly could be true if the adverse outcome is quite serious (as it was in Kokemoor, where
the patient had been rendered an incomplete paraplegic).
36 Wollen v. DePaul Health Ctr., 828 S.W.2d 681,684 (Mo. 1992).
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those patients will suffer adverse outcomes. If the alternate provider had
performed all one hundred procedures, only seventy adverse outcomes
would have occurred. Thus, ten patients will have suffered adverse out-
comes from the defendant's procedure who would not have suffered those
outcomes if the alternate provider had performed the procedure. In other
words, for ten of the patients there will be injury causation as well as deci-
sion causation. Yet, because we do not know which of the one hundred pa-
tients are in this ten-patient group, each of the eighty lawsuits that might be
brought will look the same as the single-procedure case described in the
previous paragraph. The implication of concluding that the single plaintiff
cannot recover would be that none of the eighty plaintiffs can recover, even
though ten of them satisfy all of the traditional elements of recovery and all
eighty lost the opportunity to have the procedure performed with a higher
chance of success.
Viewing the question from the perspective of multiple cases is not
merely a conceptual construct, because the medical profession consists al-
most entirely of repeat players. Not only do individual physicians tend to
perform a particular procedure many times, but hospitals and managed care
organizations, by their very nature, repeatedly provide the same services.
If, in this multiple-case context, the legal system failed to allow recov-
ery for tortious behavior that caused measurable damage, the result would
not only be unfair and morally troubling, but would also remove the deter-
rent effect of tort law that maximizes proper behavior. Acknowledging
such concerns, the legal system has striven to avoid these distasteful results.
For example, a large body of case law supports the proposition that when
physicians fail to diagnose an illness in a timely fashion, and as a result pa-
tients suffer a reduced chance of survival or optimal recovery, the law will
allow recovery for the "lost chance," even when the patient cannot prove
that survival would have been "more likely than not" had the proper diag-
nosis been made.38 These lost chance cases are indistinguishable from the
subject at hand. In both situations, the factfinder can confidently conclude
that a larger number of patients, not individually identifiable, will suffer ad-
verse consequences as a result of the tortious behavior. The legal system's
willingness to go beyond an unduly cramped traditional assessment of cau-
sation in those cases is thus strong precedent for doing so here as well.
A. Assessing "Lost Chance" Damages-Current Doctrines
The decision that a patient is entitled to recover even when, more likely
than not, the patient would have suffered the same adverse consequences at
37 This assumes that only patients who have suffered an adverse outcome will bring lawsuits. For
more on this point, see discussion supra note 33.
38 See authorities cited infra notes 46-49.
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the hands of the alternate provider does not end the analysis. 9 A determi-
nation must be made as to the damages to which such a patient is entitled.
The lost chance cases are instructive here. The case law is somewhat
divided as to the standard for valuing the lost chance interest. Herskovits v.
Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound' is illustrative. The patient had
visited the defendant's hospital with complaints of chest pain and coughing
in early 1974. In July 1975, the patient consulted a private physician who
diagnosed lung cancer. The cancerous lung was surgically removed; how-
ever, the cancer metastasized and the patient died in 1977. Assuming the
negligence of the defendant in failing to diagnose the cancer in 1974, the
court was faced with a dilemma. Had the cancer been diagnosed in 1974,
the patient's chances of surviving a "Stage One" lung cancer were thirty-
nine percent. By the time the cancer was actually diagnosed it had become
a "Stage Two" cancer, however, and the statistics for survival had dropped
to twenty-five percent. Thus, the patient suffered a reduction in his chance
of survival as a result of the negligent diagnosis. Under the standard causa-
tion formulation, a plaintiff must establish that, more probably than not,
plaintiff's injury would have been avoided had the defendant not been neg-
ligent. If this formulation were to govern the plaintiff would lose, because
even had the cancer been diagnosed in a timely manner, the probability that
plaintiff would have died from cancer anyway was sixty-one percent. Nei-
ther the majority nor concurring opinions were prepared to countenance
such a result, and they agreed that the plaintiff should prevail.
The opinions differed, however, as to how damages should be ascer-
tained. The majority opinion decided to allow recovery for lost chance in
negligent malpractice cases, but it simply allowed the jury to assess dam-
ages as it saw fit, taking all the circumstances of the case into account.4 A
more novel approach was suggested in the concurring opinion.4" Relying on
the work of a provocative law review article,43 the concurring opinion sug-
gested that damages be tailored to reflect the percentage of lost chance in-
flicted by the defendant's negligence.
1. "No Recovery" Cases. The case law since Herskovits breaks down
into ithree categories. A significant minority of jurisdictions refuse outright
to allow lost chance recovery unless a plaintiff can establish causation un-
der the traditional tort rule that the negligence of the health care provider
39 See, eg., Weymers v. Khera, 563 N.W.2d 647, 652 (Mich. 1997) ("Mhe antithesis of proximate
cause is the doctrine of lost opportunity. The... doctrine allows a plaintiff to recover when the defen-
dant's negligence possibly, i.e., a probability of fifty percent or less, caused the plaintiff's injury.").
40 664 P.2d 474 (Wash. 1983).41 Id. at 479.
42 Id. at 487 (Pearson, J., concurring). See also Shelly E. Smith, Comment, Lost Chance of Survival
in Illinois: The Need for Guidancefrom the Illinois Supreme Court, 23 LOY. U. CHI. LJ. 155, 159 (1991).
43 Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Preex-
isting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J 1353 (1981).
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more likely than not was the cause of the harm.44 If the plaintiff can meet
the standard, full recovery is allowed; if the standard cannot be met, the
plaintiff gets nothing. The reasons for insisting on satisfaction of the tradi-
tional causation standard are well rehearsed in the case law.4 The courts
that opt for the traditional rule fully understand that some plaintiffs who
have been deprived of a significant chance will be denied any compensa-
tion. They simply believe that it is wrong to single out the medical profes-
sion for a relaxed causation standard.
2. "Jury Valuation" Cases. A fair number of courts allow patients
lost chance recovery without having to prove that there was a greater than
fifty percent chance of a better result.' The decisions of some of these courts
44 See, e.g., United States v. Cumberbatch, 647 A.2d 1098 (Del. 1994) (refusing to recognize loss of
chance recovery in a wrongful death action); Gooding v. University Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015,
1020 (Fla. 1984) (finding that expert testimony did not establish that decedent had a better than even
chance to survive in the absence of negligence); Manning v. Twin Falls Clinic & Hosp., Inc., 830 P.2d
1185, 1189-90 (Idaho 1992) (rejecting explicitly the doctrines of lost chance and increased risk of
harm); Fennell v. Southern Md. Hosp. Ctr. Inc., 58 A.2d 206, 214 (Md. 1990) (declining to recognize
either a pure loss of chance doctrine or a loss of chance approach to damages); Fabio v. Bellomo, 504
N.W.2d 758, 762 (Minn. 1993) (declining to recognize loss of chance in a medical malpractice action);
Clayton v. Thompson, 475 So. 2d 439, 445 (Miss. 1985) ("Mississippi law does not permit recovery of
damages because of mere diminishment of the 'chance of recovery."'); Pillsbury-Flood v. Portsmouth
Hosp., 512 A.2d 1126, 1130 (N.H. 1986) (concluding that relaxation of causation requirements is "ill-
advised"); Sherer v. James, 351 S.E.2d 148, 151 (S.C. 1986) ("A defendant physician is entitled to put
the medical malpractice plaintiff to proof equally as stringent as that required of plaintiffs in other negli-
gence actions."); Jones v. Owings, 456 S.E.2d 371, 374 (S.C. 1995) (reaffirming Sherer and refusing to
allow recovery for loss of chance); Kilpatrick v. Bryant, 868 S.W.2d 594 (Tenn. 1993); Volz v. Ledes,
895 S.W.2d 677, 679 (Tenn. 1995) (reaffirming Kilpatrick and unwilling to recognize a new cause of
action for loss of chance); Kramer v. Lewisville Mem'l Hosp., 858 S.W.2d 397, 400 (Tex. 1993) (hold-
ing that "where preexisting illnesses or injuries have made a patient's chance of avoiding the ultimate
harm improbable"--50% or less--recovery is totally barred).
45 For a review of the various rationales offered by the courts, see Darrell L. Keith, Loss of Chance:
A Modem Proportional Approach to Damages in Texas, 44 BAYLOR L. REV. 759, 790-92 (1992). See
also Patricia L. Andel, Medical Malpractice: The Right to Recoverfor the Loss of a Chance of Survival,
12 PEPP. L. REv. 973, 976-977 (1985) (calling the "all-or-nothing" approach "harsh" and reporting that
it has been widely criticized as "result[ing] in oscillation between overlavishness and niggardliness");
Leon L. Wolfstone & Thomas J. Wolfstone, Recovery of Damages For the Loss of a Chance, 28 MED.
TRIAL TECH. Q. 121, 139 (1982) ("Most of the cases on loss of a chance.., have held that compensa-
tion should be allowed on an all or nothing basis... ."); Jeffrey L. Benson, Comment, The Dilemma of
Chance in Medical Malpractice: Should Illinois Recognize a New Cause of Action for "Lost Chance"
of Survivability, 9 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 575, 586 (1989) ("Since the majority of jurisdictions award com-
pensation on an 'all or nothing' basis, a defendant may be held liable for the full wrongful death dam-
ages even in cases where he only caused a portion of the loss."); Stephen F. Brennwald, Comment,
Proving Causation in "Loss of a Chance" Cases: A Proportional Approach, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 747,
781 (1985) ("The 'all-or-nothing rule' throws wrongful payments either entirely on defendants or en-
tirely on plaintiffs.").
46 See, e.g., Thompson v. Sun City Community Hosp., Inc., 688 P.2d 605, 615 (Ariz. 1984); Hast-
ings v. Baton Rouge Gen. Hosp., 498 So. 2d 713,720 (La. 1986); Aasheim v. Humberger, 695 P.2d 824,
828 (Mont 1985); Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 664 P.2d 474, 479 (Wash. 1983); Ehlinger v.
Sipes, 454 N.W.2d 754, 763 (Wis. 1990). See also Andel, supra note 45, at 982, 993 ("A minority of
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adopt a lost chance approach to causation but fail to implement the theory
in a coherent fashion. Having relaxed the standard of proof for causation,
they submit the issue of proximate cause to the jury under a general proxi-
mate cause instruction. The jury is thus left to its own devices as to whether
or how to discount damages. The net effect is that juries are empowered to
grant full compensation or some reduced figure as they please.47 We be-
lieve that this approach confuses the traditional deference given to juries to
value a loss with the need to articulate a calculus as how to translate that
amount into an appropriate award in lost chance.
3. Reduction of Chance Cases and Threshold Requirements. In the
third category of post-Herskovits lost chance cases, juries are provided with
the calculus that is missing in the jury valuation cases. Typically, they
multiply the full damages that would have been awarded in a traditional
causation case by the portion of the patient's chance of survival that was
lost.43 For example, the concurring opinion in Herskovits argued that the
courts ... have allowed a relaxed standard of proof of causation where the patient shows that the physi-
cian's negligent conduct in any way increased the risk of harm to the patient or deprived him of some
chance of recovery," and that such recoveries have "received increasing approval by various courts over
the years.'); Francis Wayne Thurman, Note, Loss of Chance in Medical Malpractice Cases: A Contra
View With an Examination of Tennessee's Current Position, 20 MEM'Is ST. U. L. lEv. 81, 91 (1989)
("The loss of chance doctrine, as applied to medical malpractice, allows the plaintiff to recover for the
loss of a less than even chance of survival or recovery or for an increased risk of harm.").
47 See, eg., Sun City Community Hosp., 688 P.2d at 615 ("This formulation, of course, merely rec-
ognizes that juries often discount damages according to the statistical evidence in order to accurately
evaluate the true loss."); Ehlinger, 454 N.W.2d at 763 ("If the defendant's negligence is found to have
been a substantial factor in causing the harm, the trier of fact may also consider evidence of the likeli-
hood of success of proper treatment in determining the amount of damages to be awarded."). See also
Robert A. Reisig, Jr., The Loss of a Chance Theory in Medical Malpractice Cases: An Overview, 13
AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 1163, 1183 (1990) (reporting that one of the disadvantages of allowing the trier of
fact to determine damages "without providing any real guidelines" is that "it is incompatible with one of
the major goals of recognizing the loss of a chance theory-a more accurate loss allocation"); Brennwald,
supra note 45, at 798-99 (describing the jury valuation approach as the simplest to apply and adequate
where very little statistical medical evidence as to the lost chance exists but, where medical evidence is
available, as running counter to the lost chance doctrine's goal of allocating damages more correctly).
But see Smith, supra note 42, at 177 (reporting that this jury valuation approach gives "more leeway"
than a straight percentage approach and that a possible benefit to this approach, despite considerable
variation in expert testimony as to rates of survival, is that "the figure that a jury of twelve arrives at will
be the result of a more complex valuation process" that includes an assessment of more factors than
would be considered with a straight percentage approach).
48 Almost all the cases in this category rely on the landmark article by Joseph H. King, Jr., supra
note 43. See, eg., Mays v. United States, 608 F. Supp. 1476, 1483 (D. Colo. 1985); DeBurkarte v. Lou-
var, 393 N.W.2d 131, 135-37 (Iowa 1986); Delaney v. Cade, 873 P.2d 175, 186-187 (Kan. 1994); Fal-
con v. Memorial Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44, 50 n.20, 52-53 nn.26-27 (Mich. 1990); Wollen v. DePaul
Health Ctr., 828 S.W.2d 681, 683-84 (Mo. 1992); Perez v. Las Vegas Med. Ctr., 805 P.2d 589, 591
(Nev. 1991); Scafidi v. Seiler, 574 A.2d 398, 407-08 (N.J. 1990); Roberts v. Ohio Permanente Med.
Group, Inc., 668 N.E.2d 480,483-84 (Ohio 1996); McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d 467,
476 (Okla. 1990). See also Reisig, supra note 47, at 1185 (reporting that most courts that have ad-
dressed the issue of how loss of chance damages should be valued have "used variations of King's sin-
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plaintiff should receive only fourteen percent of a total recovery because the
defendant's actions reduced the plaintiffs chances of survival from thirty-
nine percent to twenty-five percent. Some courts limit such recovery to
cases in which the loss was "substantial," while others do not impose such
a requirement. It is not at all clear why a substantiality requirement should
be imposed as a requisite for proportional recovery." We suspect that those
courts imposing such a requirement are concerned that small reductions of
chance are not reliable enough to impose liability for damages.
gle outcome approach"); Smith, supra note 42, at 176-77 (reporting that this method of valuing damages
by the percentage of lost chance "has been widely accepted, in large part due to the influence of Profes-
sor King's article"). It should be noted that in toxic tort cases where the toxic agent caused an increased
risk to persons exposed over and above the background risk indigenous to society at large, courts have
suggested utilizing proportional causation to assess damage to "indeterminate plaintiffs." In these cases,
it is impossible to determine whether a plaintiff's disease emanated from the background risk or was
caused by the toxic agent. See, eg., In re "Agent Orange" Products Liability Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740,
837-38 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). See also, PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS ToXIc
DISASTERS IN THE COURTS, 187-88 (1987).
49 See, eg., Delaney, 873 P.2d at 186 ("[E]vidence must show that the patient had a 'substantial'
chance of survival or of a better recovery.. . "); Perez, 805 P.2d at 592 (expressing doubt that a "ten
percent chance of survival... would be actionable"); McKellips, 741 P.2d at 474 (lost chance applies
"where a health care provider deprives a patient of a significant chance for recovery... '); Falcon, 462
N.W.2d at 56 ("loss of a substantial opportunity"). See also Andel, supra note 45, at 988 ("[T]hese
courts have added an additional complicating element-the 'substantial factor' test, under which the pa-
tient must still prove that the physician's negligence was a substantial factor in causing his injury.");
Smith, supra note 42, at 178 (arguing that if the Illinois Supreme Court would limit lost chance recovery
to those cases where the loss is "substantial," it would limit recovery to only "truly meritorious cases.").
so While courts that allow the jury free reign to evaluate lost chance damages (thus potentially al-
lowing a jury to assess the full value of the claim against a physician who has deprived a plaintiff of a
chance of recovery) might wish to impose a substantiality requirement to assure that such onerous dam-
ages are not extracted from a defendant without proof that the lost chance was not trivial, courts that al-
low only for proportional recovery have no good reason for imposing such a requirement. If the
statistics supporting the lost chance are reliable, a plaintiff should not be denied recovery simply because
the lost chance reduction is not "substantial." In many cases small reductions are not likely to result in
significant damages. However, in the case of a young person who was deprived, for example, of a five
percent chance of fifty years of survival, the damages could be meaningful even though the reduction
was not substantial.
In the comparative provider setting, one could argue that the substantiality requirement is necessary
to assure that the risk is material and is one that a reasonable physician would have provided or a rea-
sonable patient would have desired before submitting to the procedure. Materiality must be established
as an element of an informed consent action. The substantiality of the risk reduction is, however, a poor
substitute for a straightforward evaluation of the materiality requirement. When, for example, the risk
reduction is small but the consequence of a failed procedure is great, the information concerning pro-
vider performance may well be considered material to either a reasonable doctor or a reasonable patient.
It is possible that the differential, though statistically significant, may be so small that a finder of fact
would determine that neither reasonable doctors nor reasonable patients would consider the differential
sufficiently important to take into account. It is likely that the materiality question will be resolved dif-
ferently depending on whether a jurisdiction utilizes the reasonable doctor or reasonable patient stan-
dard. See discussion supra notes 2, 29. Laypersons may attach far greater significance to provider
statistics than physicians. In any event, it would be unwise to utilize the substantiality of the reduction
of risk as a substitute for a rigorous examination of the issue of materiality.
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The reliability of the statistics is an issue that deserves careful atten-
tion.5 1 Courts are free to apply statistical facts to set a threshold for deter-
mining that a meaningful difference exists between providers. It is possible
that substantial observed differences may be based on too little data for the
differences to be statistically significant 2 or that the data may be flawed.
The opposite is also true; small observed differences may be based on a
large amount of reliable data. Once it is determined that the data support
the inference of reduced chance, though, there seems to be no good reason
that plaintiffs who have suffered a real, cognizable reduced chance should
not be compensated, even if the reduction is small.
An additional reason for not engrafting a substantiality requirement
onto the proportional recovery principle is that it will force individualized
determinations of what constitutes "substantial." This issue is likely to en-
gender considerable appellate review, given that satisfying the substantiality
requirement would be a prerequisite to recovery. Appellate courts would
have to grapple with an amorphous and almost indeterminable issue. It
would appear far better to recognize proportional recovery for lost chance
as an across-the-board doctrine and directly confront issues such as statisti-
cal significance and the reliability of data.
It may well be that even those courts that insist on utilizing a traditional
causation test for liability in lost chance malpractice cases would be willing
to adopt the proportionate liability standard in an informed-choice setting.
As we noted earlier, some courts have had difficulty justifying limiting lost
chance recovery to malpractice cases53 because all cause-in-fact cases based
on a hypothetical but-for test are at least theoretically susceptible to a lost
chance analysis. After all, a defendant's negligence by definition always
increases the risk of harm to a plaintiff; if not, it would not be negligent.
Would a plaintiff who slipped and fell while running down an unlit stairway
51 In this context, we use "reliability of the statistics" to refer to a variety of potential problems as-
sociated with the proffered information-including inaccurate data, incomplete data, and faulty analysis
of the data. For an interesting discussion of such problems, see SCHUCK, supra note 48, at 272.
52 Choice of a level of statistical significance reflects important policy determinations as to the rela-
tive costs of wrongfully imposing liability and wrongfully denying it. See Confidence in Probability,
supra note 34, at 410-17; Neil B. Cohen, Conceptualizing Proof and Calculating Probabilities: A Re-
sponse to Professor Kaye, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 78, 94 (1987).
53 See, eg., Sherer v. James, 351 S.E.2d 148, 151 (S.C. 1986) ("A defendant physician is entitled to
put the medical malpractice plaintiff to proof equally as stringent as that required of plaintiffs in other
negligence actions."); Kramer v. Lewisville Mem'l Hosp., 858 S.W.2d 397, 406 (Tex. 1993) ("[lI]t is
doubtful that there is any principled way we could prevent its application to similar actions involving
other professions."). But see Richard Delgado, Beyond Sindell: Relaxation of Cause-In-Fact Rules for
Indeterminate Plaintiffs, 70 CAL. L. REv. 881, 889 (1982) (arguing that "destruction of a chance" cases,
including medical malpractice, seem superficially similar to toxic substance exposure cases, but that the lost
chance rubric will fail to solve such cases because "unlike the surgical victim, the (exposure victim] do[es] not
know that human causes are responsible, even in part, for their injury; they merely suspect it," and thus recov-
ery in such cases would require "major extension of notions of standing and legal rights...').
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have fallen anyway even if the light had been on?4 Would a plaintiff who
was injured when her defective brakes failed after going through a heavy
stream of water have suffered a similar injury even if her brakes had not
been defective, given the effect that water can have on brakes?5 If, despite
these conjectures, we must follow the traditional "more probable than not"
rule in other tort settings, the argument goes, the negligent diagnosis setting
should not mandate a different rule.
In the informed-choice setting, however, the underlying claim does not
fit easily into the negligence rubric. 6 The plaintiff seeks recovery for a
dignitary tort-the physician's invasion of one's body without having
shared significant information before undertaking the medical procedure.
Dignitary torts do not require actual damages as an element of the cause of
action.st Comparative provider statistics would thus be utilized not to create
a classic tort, but, rather, to measure damages for an offense that tradition-
ally does not require a causal link to actual damages. This stretch is not
quite so demanding.
To this point, we have concluded that provider-specific informed
choice cases are more easily justiciable than procedure-directed cases. Deci-
sion causation is more easily established in the former, because it is highly
credible that a patient would have opted for a medical provider whose per-
formance was demonstrably better. In addition, injury causation is more di-
rectly analyzable, and lost chance doctrines provide a doctrinal umbrella for
assessing liability. Yet, the case law to date has not, in our opinion, fully
considered how to assess the measurement of liability in those cases.
Reynolds v. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co., 37 La. Ann. 694 (La. 1885).
55 Midwestern V.W. Corp. v. Ringley, 503 S.W.2d 745 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973).
56 Almost all courts treat informed consent cases as actions for negligently failing to provide the
requisite information to the patient. See APPLEBAUM ET. AL., supra note 3, at 118 ("The dispute over
whether a lawsuit alleging lack of informed consent ought to be treated as a battery or as professional
negligence has slowly withered away. By the mid-1970s, almost all states that had considered the ques-
tion had concluded that inadequate disclosure is actionable only as professional negligence, not bat-
tery."). See; eg., Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 8 (Cal. 1972); Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 557 (Okla.
1979); Trogun v. Fruchtman, 207 N.W.2d 297, 312 (Wis. 1973). Occasionally, courts lapse into battery
language. See, eg., Congrove v. Holmes, 308 N.E.2d 765, 770-71 (Ohio 1973); Cardwell v. Bechtel,
724 S.W.2d 739, 750 (Tenn. 1987) ("[W]hile determining whether the Defendant failed to obtain in-
formed consent is dependent upon the standard of care of the profession .... [the absence of informed
consent] is not negligence but battery.. ."). Nonetheless, almost all commentators have noted that the
law of negligence does not provide an adequate framework when the true issue is the protection of a pa-
tient's autonomous right to make an informed decision. See generally APPLEBAUM ET. AL., supra note
3, at 122; Jay Katz, Informed Consent-A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39 U. PT. L. REv. 137 (1977);
Reflections on Human Dignity, supra note 3, at 690-98; Looking for the Action, supra note 3; From In-
formed Consent to Patient Choice, supra note 3.
57 See Marcus L. Pante, An Analysis of "Informed Consent," 36 FORDHAM L. Rev. 639, 666-667
(1968); Looking for the Action, supra note 3, at 584-85; From Informed Consent to Patient Choice, su-
pra note 3, at 225, 232.
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B. Getting Proportional Recovery Right
As noted above,58 deciding to allow recovery for lost chance damages
reflects an understanding that the failure to do so would immunize negligent
providers from the effects of their negligence and deny all patients recovery
when some of them were damaged by the provider's tortious conduct. De-
ciding to allow recovery for lost chance, though, is not the same thing as
deciding how to measure that recovery. After all, allowing a full recovery
for the adverse outcome in every lost chance case would overcompensate
plaintiffs and penalize defendants.59 The previous section surveyed the ap-
proach to damages in existing lost chance cases. This section addresses that
question analytically, seeking to develop an appropriate rule that neither un-
fairly penalizes defendants nor undercompensates plaintiffs.
The appropriate rule, we believe, is one that would, over the long run of
cases, result in total damages assessed against defendants equaling the total
losses suffered by plaintiffs. Accomplishing this result, of course, is made
more difficult by the fact that we do not know whether any particular
plaintiff was actually hurt by the defendant's failure to obtain the plaintiff's
informed consent. We can determine probabilistically, however, the ex-
pected total damage over a large number of similar cases.
For purposes of this analysis, four paradigm cases will be used. In
each case, it is assumed that the differences between the success or failure
rates6 of the providers would be sufficient to cause a reasonable patient to
select the more proficient provider."' It is also assumed in each case that
58 See sources cited supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
59 Consider, for example, the situation in which the defendant's success rate for the procedure in
question is 20%, while the success rate of the alternate provider is 30%, and the defendant performed the
procedure on 100 patients. If each of the 80 patients who suffered the adverse outcome were awarded
full recovery, there would be 80 full recoveries even though 70 of those 80 patients would have suffered
the same adverse outcome from the alternate provider. See also Brennwald, supra note 45, at 777 (ar-
guing that courts which fail to limit compensation proportionally "expose tortfeasors to liability greatly
in excess of culpability").
60 For these purposes, we are using the term "success rate" for the percentage of cases in which the
procedure, as performed by the provider in question, will yield a successful result, and the term "failure
rate" for the percentage of cases in which the procedure, as performed by the provider in question, will
yield an unsuccessful result. For simplicity, we assume a binomial distribution-i.e., all outcomes are
either "successes" or "failures."
61 Of course, in the real world of imperfect data collection and methodological disputes about risk
adjusting, it is likely that defendants will challenge any asserted success or failure rates as inaccurate or
imperfect and thus not capable of supporting a cause of action. Yet, such a challenge is inappropriate
for decision causation purposes. The point is not whether the withheld information is perfect; no infor-
mation is perfect. Rather, the question is whether reasonable patients would have relied on that infor-
mation, however imperfect, in choosing a provider. Such reliance need not be based on concepts of
statistical significance at traditional thresholds, such as the p < 0.05 level (equivalent to a 95% confi-
dence level) typically used in epidemiological and social science research. The choice of such a rigor-
ous standard is based on an implicit value judgment that it is very important to avoid "Type I" (i.e., false
positive) error and that the risk of "Type IT" (i.e., false negative) error is of less concern. In this context,
it would reflect a value judgment that it is very important to avoid concluding incorrectly on the basis of
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$100,000 would compensate the plaintiff for the difference between an ad-
verse outcome and a successful outcome.
The paradigms are as follows:
Paradigm One ("Stark Difference"): Provider A (the defendant) has a twenty-
percent failure rate for the procedure in question, while Provider B (the
alternative provider) has an eight-percent failure rate.
Paradigm Two ("Moderate Difference"): Provider A (the defendant) has a
twenty-percent failure rate for the procedure in question, while Provider B
(the alternative provider) has a twelve-percent failure rate.
Paradigm Three ("Slight Difference"): Provider A (the defendant) has a
twenty-percent failure rate for the procedure in question, while Provider B
(the alternative provider) has a seventeen-percent failure rate.
Paradigm Four ("Slim Chance"): Provider A (the defendant) has a ninety-
percent failure rate for the procedure in question, while Provider B (the
alternative provider) has a seventy-five-percent failure rate.
It should be noted from the outset that, for each paradigm, there will be pa-
tients of Provider A (the defendant) who do not suffer an adverse outcome.
While, as we have argued elsewhere, there is a dignitary element in in-
formed consent bases that might entitle plaintiffs to compensation for the
failure to disclose appropriate information even in the absence of injury
causation, 2 it is unlikely that patients of Provider A who do not suffer ad-
verse outcomes will bring suit for the failure to obtain informed consent.
Accordingly, our analysis proceeds on the assumption that the damages at-
tributable to losses suffered because of injuries caused by the failure to ob-
tain informed consent (that is, cases in which there is both decision
causation and injury causation) will be available only to plaintiffs who have
the available data that a provider with the higher observed failure rate actually has a higher risk of fail-
ure, but of less concern that this might result in failing to reach that conclusion when it is, in fact, true.
A patient's choice, though, is not between reaching or not reaching a conclusion as to the relative risk
associated with two providers-it is between choosing one provider or the other provider. Making no
choice is not an option. To illustrate the difference, consider a pre-election presidential poll that showed
the Democratic candidate with 54% of the vote and the Republican candidate with 46% of the vote. The
pollsters have noted that at the 95% confidence level (p < 0.05), those figures are plus or minus 6%. If
one were asked, "Can you confidently predict who will win the election?" the answer would likely be
"no." If, on the other hand, circumstances forced one to make a prediction as to which candidate was
most likely to win, the answer would be easy-the Democrat. A patient's choice as to which provider to
utilize is more like the second scenario than the first; making no choice is not an option. Accordingly, a
rational patient would be likely to utilize differences in success or failure rates for alternative providers
in her decision process even if those differences would not lead an epidemiologist to conclude at the
95% confidence level that the differences are significant. See generally Cohen, Confidence in Probabil-
ity, supra note 34, at 385.
62 See Twerski & Cohen, The Myth ofJusticiable Causation, supra note 3, at 655-64.
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suffered adverse outcomes. Damages for dignitary harm should be consid-
ered separately.63
Consider Paradigm One. Imagine that one hundred patients undergo
the procedure in question performed by Provider A. The information pro-
vided tells us that twenty of those patients will have an adverse outcome.
Had those patients undergone the procedure with Provider B, however, only
eight of them would have suffered the adverse outcome. In other words,
twelve out of the twenty patients of A who suffered adverse outcomes
would not have suffered such outcomes with B. A little calculation reveals
that, for each patient of A who suffered an adverse outcome, the chances
are twelve out of twenty, or sixty percent, that the patient would not have
suffered an adverse outcome from B's treatment. Sixty percent is, of
course, greater than fifty percent; thus, it is more likely than not that A's
failure to disclose caused each patient's losses.
A good example of Paradigm One can be found in existing studies of
risk-adjusted mortality rates (RAMR) for angioplasty." In New York's
1997 study of these rates, for example, one hospital provider ("Hospital
One") had a RAMR of 1.31, while that of another hospital provider ("Hos-
pital Two") was 0.40.65 This translates to approximately thirteen deaths per
thousand angioplasties at Hospital One, while there are only four per thou-
sand at Hospital Two.' Thus, for every thirteen patients who die from an-
gioplasties performed at Hospital One, nine would have survived at
Hospital Two. In other words, the probability that each unfortunate patient
who died at the hands of Hospital One would have survived at the hands of
Hospital Two is nine out of thirteen, or approximately sixty-nine percent.
This probability is, of course, greater than fifty percent. 7
At first blush, one might simply decide that, since each patient who
suffered an adverse outcome at Provider A or Hospital One in these exam-
ples can meet the preponderance standard of civil litigation, each should re-
cover full compensation for losses associated with that outcome. Further
calculation, though, reveals problems with such a rule. That rule would, for
63 See id. at 661-63.
6 See NEW YORK STATE, ANGIOPLASTY, supra note 8. A chart prepared by the New York
State Department of Health summarizing its findings appears in Appendix B. For purposes of the illus-
trative paradigms in this article, we have assumed the methodological and statistical validity of the risk-
adjusted mortality rates. For a more extensive analysis of that issue, see Jesse Green, Problems in the
Use of Outcome Statistics to Compare Health Care Providers, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 55 (1992).
65 The hospitals noted as One, Two, and Three in the text do not follow the order of the hospitals as
set forth in the New York study. They were chosen among the hospitals in the study to document how
lost chance calculations can be made as between different providers in a real-world setting.
6 This assumes, of course, that all providers are normalized to the same risk level of patients in ac-
cordance with the RAMR methodology.
67 This illustration provides a good example of a case in which the absolute difference between the
numbers in question (1.31 and 0.40) is small, but, if one assumes the validity of the data, the probabilis-
tic effect is quite meaningful.
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example, require Provider A to pay damages equal to the losses associated
with twenty adverse outcomes, even though A's failure to disclose caused
only twelve adverse outcomes that would not also have occurred with Pro-
vider B. Thus, plaintiffs as a class would be overcompensated, and A would
end up paying more in damages than the losses he or she actually caused.
Thus, the "preponderance rule" is inappropriate for Paradigm One.
The preponderance rule would be equally inappropriate for Paradigm
Two. In that paradigm, assuming again that one hundred patients of Pro-
vider A undergo the procedure (and, therefore, that there are twenty adverse
outcomes), eight out of the twenty patients of Provider A who suffered ad-
verse outcomes would not have suffered such outcomes with Provider B.
Here, calculation reveals that, for each patient of A who suffered an adverse
outcome, the chances are eight out of twenty, or forty percent, that the pa-
tient would not have suffered an adverse outcome from B's treatment.
Forty percent is, of course, less than fifty percent; thus, it is not more likely
than not that A's failure to disclose caused each patient's losses. The
RAMR studies for angioplasty provide a good example here, as well. This
time, let us compare Hospital One, with its RAMR of 1.31, with Hospital 3,
which has a risk factor of 0.97. This translates to 131 deaths per ten thou-
sand patients at Hospital One and ninety-seven deaths per ten thousand pa-
tients at Hospital Three. Thus, thirty-four of every 131 patients who died at
Hospital One, or approximately twenty-six percent, would have survived at
Hospital Three. This number is, of course, less than fifty percent.
Under a preponderance rule, one might simply decide that, since pa-
tients in Paradigm Two who suffered an adverse outcome would not be able
to meet the preponderance standard of civil litigation, they should not re-
cover compensation for losses associated with the adverse outcome. But
such a rule would result in Provider A paying no damages for adverse out-
comes, even though Provider A's failure to disclose caused eight adverse
outcomes. Thus, plaintiffs as a class would be undercompensated, and Pro-
vider A would end up paying less in damages than the losses he or she actu-
ally caused. Thus, the preponderance rule is also inappropriate for
Paradigm Two, and similar analysis demonstrates that it is inappropriate as
well for Paradigms Three and Four.
If the preponderance rule is inappropriate, though, what should take its
place? The answer is a proportionate causation rule in which the total com-
pensation paid by the nondisclosing providers to patients suffering adverse
outcomes would, in the long run of cases, equal the total losses suffered by
those patients that would have been avoided had the alternate, less risky
provider performed the procedure. This rule, by definition, would neither
undercompensate nor overcompensate plaintiffs as a class, and it would as-
sess against defendants the actual costs of their misconduct. While propor-
tionate causation damages for lost chance cases has been adopted by some
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courts, the damage calculus in those cases have not reflected these twin
goals of avoiding both overcompensation and undercompensation. 5
" The discussion in McKellips v. Saint Francis Hsp., Inc., 741 P.2d 467, 477 (Okla. 1990), sets
forth the calculation utilized by the courts for proportional recovery:
To illustrate the method in a case where the jury determines from the statistical findings
combined with the specific facts relevant to the patient that the patient originally had a 40% chance
of cure and the physician's negligence reduced the chance of cure to 25%, 15% (40%-25%) repre-
sents the patient's loss of survival. If the total amount of damages proved by the evidence is
$500,000, the damages caused by defendant is 15% x $500,000 or $75,000.
Under this formula, however, for every 100 patients treated by the negligent physician, 75 would have
adverse outcomes. Sixty patients would have died even if an alternate provider had performed the pro-
cedure; 15 extra deaths are, therefore, attributable to the negligent physician. In our view, the patient is
thus entitled to 15/75, or 20%, of full damages rather than the 15% suggested by the court in McKellips.
The basic formula for this miscalculation of damages was set forth in Joseph H. King's article, supra
note 43, at 1382: "A better method of valuation would measure a compensable chance as the percentage
probability by which the defendant's tortious conduct diminished the likelihood of achieving some more
favorable outcome.' This miscalculation was repeated first in the concurring opinion in Herskovits v.
Group Health Co-op., 664 P.2d 474, 486 (Wash. 1983) (Pearson, J. concurring); and subsequently in
McKellips, 741 P.2d at 476 n.25 (citing the concurring opinion of Herskovits and quoting King's illus-
tration of the formula, King, supra at 1382:
To illustrate, consider a patient who suffers a heart attack and dies as a result. Assume that
the defendant-physician negligently misdiagnosed the patient's condition, but that the patient
would have had only a 40% chance of survival even with a timely diagnosis and proper care. Re-
gardless of whether it could be said that the defendant caused the decedent's death, he caused the
loss of chance and that chance-interest should be completely redressed in its own right. Under the
proposed rule, the plaintiff's compensation for the loss of the victim's surviving the heart attack
would be 40% of the compensation value of the victim's life had he survived (including what his
earning capacity would otherwise have been in the years following death) .... ).
The miscalculation has been repeated by courts with some frequency. See, e.g., Mays v. United States,
608 F. Supp. 1476, 1482-83 (D. Colo. 1985) (holding that where the court measured the reduction by
negligent medical care of patient's chance as 25%, a 40% chance reduced to a 15% chance, and where
damages were governed by state statutory "pecuniary loss" measurement, plaintiffs were entitled to 25%
of the net pecuniary loss measurement in damages); Delaney v. Cade, 873 P.2d 175, 187 (Kan. 1994)
(recommending King's approach to damage valuation as the "most logical," citing McKellips, 741 P.2d
at 467, and reporting that the same formula was employed by the federal district court in Boody v.
United States, 706 F. Supp. 1458 (D. Kan. 1989), which concluded that the "proportional damage
method was the most reasonable approach.. ."); Falcon v. Memorial Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44, 49, 57
(Mich. 1990) ("By not inserting the intravenous line, the physician deprived [plaintiff-decedent] of a
37.5% opportunity of surviving the embolism ... 37.5% times the damages recoverable for wrongful
death would be an appropriate measure of damages."); Scafidi v. Seiler, 574 A.2d 398, 408 (N.J. 1990)
(instructing a lower court to "mold [its] verdict" to limit defendant's liability to the value of lost chance;
reaffirming its acknowledgment in an earlier New Jersey Supreme Court decision, Evers v. Dollinger,
471 A.2d 405 (N.J. 1988), of Professor King's analysis as the appropriate method of resolving such
cases; and citing King's illustration of the formula); Roberts v. Ohio Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 668
N.E.2d 480, 484-85 (Ohio 1996) (citing King's approach as the "most rational" one and instructing a
lower court to compute damages using that approach by "ascertain[ing] the percentage of the patient's
lost chance of survival or recovery; and ... multiply[ing] that percentage by the total amount of [wrong-
ful death] damages"). See also Brennwald, supra note 45, at 768 (discussing the concurring opinion in
Herskovits and advocating Judge Pearson's reasoning as "the clearest judicial understanding to date of
the notion of recovery for loss of a chance" and as the solution that should be used as a model by other
courts "desiring to provide their jurisdictions with a more rational framework in which to evaluate dam-
ages for loss of a chance.. ."); Howard Ross Feldman, Chances as Protected Interests: A Recovery for
the Loss of a Chance and Increased Risk, 17 BALTIMORE L. REV. 139, 155-56 (1987) (outlining Profes-
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Constructing the appropriate model is not difficult, though. All that
needs to be done is to calculate the fraction of adverse outcomes occurring
from procedures performed by the defendant that would not have occurred
had the procedure been performed by the alternate provider, and then multi-
ply that fraction by the loss suffered by the patient in question. This rule
will result, in the long run, in damages assessed against defendants equaling
the losses that result from the additional adverse outcomes caused by their
failure to disclose.
For example, in Paradigm One, twelve out of twenty (or sixty percent)
of the patients of Provider A who suffered adverse outcomes would not
have suffered such outcomes with Provider B. Thus, in Paradigm One, pa-
tients suffering adverse outcomes from procedures performed by A should
receive sixty percent of the $100,000 damages, or $60,000. With this rule,
twenty patients (out of a hypothetical one hundred) of A would receive
$60,000 each, for a total of $1,200,000. A's failure to disclose was respon-
sible for twelve of those twenty adverse outcomes. Thus, A caused 12 x
$100,000 in loss-or $1,200,000. Thus, with this formula, plaintiffs as a
class have been accurately compensated, and the defendant pays aggregate
damages equal to the loss he or she caused. Applying the preponderance
rule, on the other hand, would have resulted in all twenty patients of A who
suffered adverse consequences receiving $100,000, for a total of $2,000,000.
With that rule, plaintiffs as a class would have been overcompensated by
$800,000, and Provider A would have paid $800,000 in excess damages.
Similar analysis works for Paradigm Two, in which eight out of twenty
(or forty percent) of the patients of Provider A who suffered adverse out-
comes would not have suffered such outcomes with Provider B. Thus, pa-
tients suffering adverse outcomes from procedures performed by A should
each receive forty percent of the $100,000 damages, or $40,000. With this
rule, twenty patients (out of a hypothetical one hundred) of A would receive
$40,000 each, for a total of $800,000. A's failure to disclose was responsi-
ble for eight of those twenty adverse outcomes. Thus, A caused 8 x
$100,000 in loss--or $800,000. Thus, with this formula, plaintiffs as a
class have been accurately compensated and the defendant pays aggregate
damages equal to the loss he or she caused. Applying the preponderance
rule, on the other hand, would have resulted in none of the twenty patients
of A who suffered adverse consequences receiving damages. With that
rule, therefore, plaintiffs as a class would have been undercompensated by
$800,000, and Provider A would have received an $800,000 windfall.
In Paradigm Three, the difference between the success or failure rates
of Provider A and Provider B is relatively small, which might lead some
courts to either decline to find a violation of informed consent standards or
decline to award damages. Yet, if the determination of the twenty percent
sor King's method of valuation of chance and calculation of damages and advocating it as the "prefer-
able" method).
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failure rate of A and the seventeen percent failure rate of B is based on reli-
able data, one can certainly imagine decisions about medical treatment for
which reasonable patients would choose B over A. 9 Using data from the
RAMR studies for angioplasty by way of example," would a fully informed
patient choose Hospital One, with its RAMR of 1.31, or Hospital Four, with
its RAMR of 1.17, for a procedure for which failure meant painful death?
If it is decided in a particular case that, had Provider A or Hospital One dis-
closed such information, the patient would have chosen the alternative pro-
vider, there is no reason not to use the calculus described above.
In Paradigm Three, three out of twenty (or fifteen percent) of the pa-
tients of Provider A who suffered adverse outcomes would not have suf-
fered such outcomes with Provider B. Thus, in Paradigm Three, patients
suffering adverse outcomes from procedures performed by A should each
receive fifteen percent of the $100,000 damages, or $15,000. With this
rule, twenty patients (out of a hypothetical 100) of A would receive $15,000
each, for a total of $300,000. A's failure to disclose was responsible for
three of those twenty adverse outcomes. Thus, A caused 3 x $100,000 in
loss-or $300,000. Thus, with this formula, plaintiffs as a class have once
again been accurately compensated and the defendant pays aggregate dam-
ages equal to the loss he or she caused. Applying the preponderance rule,
on the other hand, would have resulted in none of the twenty patients of A
who suffered adverse consequences receiving damages. With that rule,
plaintiffs as a class would have been undercompensated by $300,000, and
Provider A would have received a $300,000 windfall.
Finally, consider Paradigm Four. Under the preponderance rule, no
matter what Provider A's success or failure rate is, none of his or her pa-
tients could recover a penny. This is the case because Provider B's failure
rate of seventy-five percent leads to the conclusion that it is more likely
than not that the patient would have suffered the same adverse consequence
from Provider B's treatment. Paradigm Four is, of course, Herskovits.
Yet, as we have already demonstrated, failure to impose liability in such
cases would undercompensate plaintiffs.
Under our rule, on the other hand, patients of Provider A who suffered
adverse outcomes would, as a class, be accurately compensated. Of ninety
patients of A who suffer adverse consequences, fifteen of them would not
suffer adverse consequences from Provider B's treatment. Thus, each of
those ninety should receive fifteen ninetieths (or sixteen percent) of the
$100,000 damages, or $16,666.67. Once again the total loss suffered by
plaintiffs of $1,500,000 (representing fifteen additional adverse outcomes
69 See supra note 61 with respect to reliability data.
70 See infra App. B.
71 See supra text accompanying note 40.
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suffered as a result of treatment by A) would equal the total damages as-
sessed against Provider A.2
V. MEDICAL PROVIDER STATISTICS AND MANAGED CARE
To date, comparative provider statistics have been collected primarily
by state and federal agencies who have sought to monitor performance of
hospitals and physicians with regard to selected medical procedures. It is
clear, however, that over time the greatest repository of comparative pro-
vider performance information for surgical and diagnostic procedures will
be the managed health care industry.73 Once courts recognize a cause of
72 Our rle can be reduced to a formula. Each patient of Provider A who suffers an adverse out-
come should receive damages equal to his or her full loss multiplied by a fraction the numerator of
which is the failure rate of Provider A minus the failure rate of Provider B and the denominator of which
is the failure rate of Provider A. Symbolically:
D = L * (FA - FB)/FA
where
D = damages assessed
L = plaintiff's loss
FA = failure rate of Provider A
FB = failure rate of Provider B.
73 Although MCOs are not yet routinely self-reporting comparative provider specific data to the public, re-
ports suggest that collection and internal use of such data is widespread. See Edward Doyle, New Breed of Re-
port Cards Turn Up the Heat on Doctors, ACP OBSERVER (visited June 18,1998) <http'Jwww.acponline.orgl
jouroals/news/jan95heptard.htm> (reporting that one HMO, United Healthcare, has been amassing vast
amounts of unreleased data on individual physician performance rates and is not alone in such practice). In the
first such statewide disclosure, Pennsylvania's Health Care Cost Containment Council included mortality rates
for each of 34 health plan providers in addition to more ordinary per physician mortality rates in its annual
study of heart surgery provider outcomes. PENNSYLVANIAHEALTH CARE COST CONTAINMENT COUNCIt, su-
pra note 8. See also Anita J. Slornki, How the Clinton Plan Would Judge Your Performance, 71 MED. ECON.
83 (1994) (describing a bill proposed by the Clinton administration that would require all health plans and
HMOs to collect and publish a variety of provider-specific performance and quality data, including RAMR,
noting that the administration's proposals for such data collection were modeled on programs already in place
at HMOs such as Kaiser Permanente, United Healthcare, and U.S. Healthcare). Evidence that MCOs are col-
lecting such provider-performance data abounds. For example, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) is an organization which accredits approximately 18,000 healthcare or-
ganizations, including some 40 "health plans," which are defined as including HMOs, PIAs, MCOs, PPOs,
PHOs, and PSNs. See JCAHO (visited Sept. 14,1998) <http.//www.jcaho.org/acrorgs/hhlthpl.hbi > [herein-
after JCAHO]. See also Telephone Interview by Kim Houghton with Julie Roberts, Communications Division,
JCAHO, Oakbrook Terrace, Ill. (Sept. 24,25, 1998) (discussing the inclusion of MCO and HMO health plans
among accredited organizations that will be required to comply with JCAHO's ORYX measurement and re-
porting initiative in the near future). The JCAHO has instituted an ORYX initiative which will require over
time that all of its accredited health care organizations, including MCOs, comply by selecting and maintaining
some form of "performance measurement system" See U See also lameter Inc. (visited Sept. 15, 1998)
<http.//lameter.comhtml/JCAHO&ORYXhtnl> (website of software company marketing provider perform-
ance measurement software system that provides "reliable risk-adjusted physician profiling" to JCAHO par-
ticipating organizations; website explains compliance with JCAHO's initiative); JCAHO, supra. To
comply with ORYX, the health care organizations are allowed to choose at least two from an approved list
of performance measures that their system must maintain. This list includes measures such as risk-adjusted
mortality outcomes. See JCAHO, supra, at <http'/www. jcaho.org/peraineaoryx/lpmsevalht-n>. Further,
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action for failure to provide comparative provider statistics, it is inevitable
that managed care organizations (MCOs) will become targets for plaintiffs
claiming that they were not given comparative provider information and
thus are entitled to compensation for failure to obtain informed consent.74
The obstacles to recovery will be substantial. First, depending on the
form of the MCO, plaintiffs may face the argument that MCOs are not pri-
mary medical care providers who owe direct duties to patients. Second, as
we discuss in more detail below, plaintiffs will have to overcome the con-
tention that such claims are barred or preempted by the federal Employment
Retirement and Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).75 Despite these ob-
stacles, it is our opinion that the concentration of critical decision informa-
tion in the hands of the MCOs will serve as the engine to drive the
recognition of a duty on the part of MCOs to furnish comparative provider
information to their members. Once the tort duty is given clear recognition,
ERISA will not stand in the way of recovery.
A. Establishing an MCO 's Duty to Disclose Provider Statistics
Before the recent managed care revolution in American health care,
most patients and doctors were involved in what can be called a "traditional"
health care relationship. Individual physicians treated individual patients
who paid for medical services either directly to the physician or through an
indemnity-based health insurance policy. In general, the legal relationship
vendors of commercially available software perfornmce measurement systems designed for MCOs, hospitals,
and physician groups advertise MCOs as clients of their performance data collection programs on their com-
mercial websites. See, e-g., QuadraMed Corp. (visited Sept. 4, 1998) <http:/www.quadramed.com.hbil.
Ira clients.html> (website advertising company's healthcare management software lines, which includes capa-
bilities for collecting risk-adjusted outcomes measures, and listing clients of its software, including "provider
networks" and "integrated delivery systems"); Apache Medical Systems (visited Sept. 15, 1998) <http!//www.
apache-msi.con pepremier.htm> (website advertising software program, which includes risk-adjusted out-
comes measuremten, and identifying clients, including MCOs).
74 Commentators have recently questioned the premises of traditional informed consent law in the
environment of managed care. See, eg., PAUL T. MENZEL, STRONG MEDICINE: THE ETHICAL RATIONING
OF HEALTH CARE 145 (1990) (physician should be required to provide information that could realisti-
cally be acted on by patient); E. HAAVI MORREIM, BALANCING ACT: THE NE.W MEDICAL ETHICS OF
MEDICINE'S NEW ECONOMICS 115 (1991) (disclosure required if there is a realistic possibility that pa-
tient could arrange for alternate treatment); Rethinking Informed Consent, supra note 23, at 941
("[P]olicymakers ... may view as an insupportable extravagance a doctrine requiring physicians to
spend more time engaging in more extensive dialogues with patients about altematives that are no
longer practically available to them... ."). Comparative provider statistics, especially if made available
to choose between providers that are within a given managed care network, would allow a patient a
choice between physicians and hospitals that could be highly significant. Such comparative statistics
would also respond to Professor Schuck's suggestion that informed consent include presenting com-
parative risk information to patients. See Shuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, supra note 23, at 948-
51. Even the harshest critic of an individual-autonomy-based theory of informed consent would likely
agree that comparative provider statistics should be revealed to patients about to undergo a procedure.
See RogerB. Dworkin, Medical Law and Ethics in the Post-Autonomy Age, 68 IND. LJ. 727,741 (1993).
75 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994). See infra text accompanying notes 92-107.
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was clearly defined. Physicians had the duty to act reasonably in treating
their patients, and patients decided what treatment, and how much of it, to
pursue, depending on the limits of the indemnity policy or the patients'
ability to pay. Although traditional health care -insurers may have been in
possession of some provider-specific information, the indemnitor-indemnitee
relationship did not in itself suffice to trigger a duty to disclose such infor-
mation to all insureds. The insurer had no formal relationship with the
health care provider and made no representations of any kind as to the com-
petence of any provider. The insurer did not provide any incentive to the
insured to choose any given provider. Finally, the number of providers
covered by a traditional plan was limitless. An insured could consult any
physician and be reimbursed for the monies expended in receiving medical
services. The open-ended nature of the coverage and the arm's-length rela-
tionship between insurer and insured made the imposition of a direct duty
on the part of an insurer to disclose comparative medical provider data to its
insured both jurisprudentially unsound and practically unworkable.
All of this has changed in the managed care environment. Today, a
patient's access to health care providers and treatment options is affected by
the rules and incentive structure of the patient's MCO. In this new envi-
ronment, the question of whether an MCO's possession of provider-specific
information imposes on the MCO the same duty of disclosure as that im-
posed on a traditional direct provider is more nuanced.
The answer is clearest for the "staff model" health maintenance or-
ganization (HMO) in which all the medical providers are employees of the
HMO.76 Under respondeat superior principles, the LIMO is responsible for
the legal consequences of the failure of its employees to make appropriate
disclosures. If a physician fails to obtain informed consent and is therefore
liable for negligence, the employer is liable. What if, however, the HMO
itself has the relevant information but has not made it available to the phy-
sician in question? It is clear that the IMO, as the direct provider of health
care services, has a duty of disclosure under these circumstances. An em-
ployer cannot immunize itself from liability by keeping its employees igno-
rant of information critical to the employees' ability to perform their
assigned responsibilities non-negligently.7
76 See CHARLES G. BENDA & FAY A. ROSOVSKY, MANAGED CARE AND THE LAW § 1.3, at 1-7, §
2.4.1, at 2-11 (1997) (describing both a "closed staff' model HMO, which limits "the participation of
physicians, and consequently the choice of members, to physicians who are employees of the HMO or
members of a specified contract group," and an "open staff' model HMO, which "opens physician par-
ticipation, and member choice, by contracting with an array of individual physicians in a community
either directly or through an individual practice association (IPA)").
77 See U.C.C. § 1-201(27) (1998) (stating that notice to an organization is effective from the time it
would have been communicated to the person conducting the transaction for the organization if the or-
ganization exercised due diligence, i.e., the maintenance of reasonable routines for communicating sig-
nificant information to the person conducting the transaction). C. Fisher v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 994
F.2d 130, 135 (3d Cir. 1993) (employers should identify to employees which persons are authorized to
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The analysis is more difficult for other forms of MCOs such as "group
model" HMOs,78 "network model" HMOs, 79 "preferred provider organiza-
tions" (PPOs),80 or "point of service plans" (POSs).' In these forms of
MCO the physician is not employed by the MCO, and thus the respondeat
superior doctrine does not apply. Furthermore, the MCO is not the direct
provider of health services, and a duty to disclose cannot be pegged solely
on the MCO's contractual responsibility to provide access to medical pro-
viders on agreed economic terms. If the law is to recognize a duty to dis-
close, it must emanate from a different source.
Some courts have sought to impose liability on MCOs for physician
malpractice based on a theory of apparent authority. 2 The viability of such
communicate important information about employee benefits plans and plan changes, and "[employer]
obligations cannot be circumvented by building a 'Chinese wall' around those employees on whom the
plan participants reasonably rely for important information and guidance about retirement... "). See
also John M. Vine, The Supreme Court's Downsizing Decisions: How To Do It and How Not To Do It,
548 PLI/LIT 589, 609 (1996) (citing Bixler v. Central Pa. Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d
1292, 1300 (3d Cir. 1993) (employees have an "affirmative duty to inform when fiduciary knows that
silence might be harmfur)).
78 See BENDA, supra note 76, § 2.4.1, at 2-11 ("The group model HMO contracts with a physician
group that can provide all of the physician services required by the enrolled members .... The physi-
cians are employees of the group practice, not the HMO... [Tihe HMO and the physician group may be
independent entities, [or] the HMO may have created the group, or the group may have established (and
own) the HMO.").
79 See id. at 2-11, 2-12 ("[The network model HMO contracts with multiple group practices to pro-
vide the services required by enrolled members .... It operates very similar to the group model HMO.").
80 See id. § 2A.2, at 2-12, 2-13 ("PPOs are organizations of providers contracted by an insurer, em-
ployer, or administrator to deliver care for individuals covered by a participating health plan .... Plan
members are not prohibited from using other providers as they are under HMOs, although there are usu-
ally financial incentives to discourage this.").
8' See id. § 2A.3, at 2-14 ("POS plans involve a basic HMO or PPO approach with the option to re-
ceive care from providers who are not part of the HMO or PPO network of providers .... Members
typically have a choice of using nonparticipating providers or obtaining unauthorized services but are
required to pay much higher deductibles and copayments ... the [POS] typically has higher monthly
[premium] rates for members than do the [HMO or PPO] plans.").
82 Apparent authority is defined as "the power to affect the legal relations of another person by
transactions with third persons, professedly as agent for the other," and as resulting from "a manifesta-
tion by a person that another is his agent, the manifestation being made to a third person . . .
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §8 (1958). Further, liability for the lack of skill or care of an ap-
parent agent may be imposed on those who represent to others that the apparent agent is their servant or
other agent, thereby causing justifiable reliance by a third person on the care or skill of that apparent
agent. See id. §267. For courts' reasoning in imposing liability on HMOs based on these principles,
see, for example, Petrovich v. Share Health Plan, 696 N.E.2d 356, 364 (I1. App. Ct. 1998) (plaintiff
was precluded from sufficient discovery of LMO defendant's "advertising materials" which would "go
to the [ostensible agency] elements of 'holding out' and justifiable reliance," and thus grant of summary
judgment in favor of defendant HMO was "premature"). See also Decker v. Saini, No. 88-361768, 1991
WL 277590, at *3 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Sept. 17, 1991) ((i) refusing to grant summary judgment to defendant
HMO on ostensible agency claim; (ii) concluding that plaintiff had provided sufficient evidence of
HMO holding itself out as health care provider, of plaintiff's reliance on that representation, and of
plaintiff's reasonable belief that doctor who failed to timely diagnose a tumor resulting in partial arm
amputation was acting as agent of the HMO; and (iii) noting that "lack of precedent does not preclude
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a theory depends on the representations and marketing of the health care
plans by the MCO in question. If an apparent authority theory stands up to
scrutiny, it would, in our opinion, support MCO liability for failure to dis-
close comparative provider information even when the treating physician
did not have the relevant data and could not provide it to the patient. The
heart of an apparent authority theory in a tort case is that the principal, by
holding out another person as its agent, is responsible for that person's acts.
Once apparent authority (or actual authority) is found, the principal is
treated, for purposes of tort law, essentially as if the agent were part of the
principal's organization. In our context, this would transform the MCO, for
liability purposes, into the equivalent of a staff model HMO. As we argued
above, there should be no difficulty in placing responsibility on such an
HMO for the consequences of failure to disclose information at its disposal.
Most courts, however, have been unwilling to impose tort liability on
an MCO based on an apparent authority theory. 3 Thus, we must face the
[the court] from imposing liability on [an HMO] under a theory of ostensible agency if the facts so war-
rant"); McClellan v. Health Maintenance Org., 604 A.2d 1053, 1058 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (following
Boyd and reinstating claim of liability against HMO based on ostensible agency theory where primary
care physician who allegedly failed to timely diagnose a fatal melanoma was "held out as agent of
[HMO]," and where the "[HMO] represented that their primary care physicians were carefully screened
and fully qualified physicians who would render competent medical care to HMO members. . ."); Boyd
v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229, 1235 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (citing to RnsTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 in reversing summary judgment of lower court that had refused to recog-
nize liability of HMO based on "ostensible agency" theory and thus allowing trial to resolve material
issue of fact as to liability based on agency theory). See also Jim M. Perdue & Stephen I Baxley, Cut-
ting Costs-Cutting Care: Can Texas Managed Health Care Systems and HMOs Be Liable for the
Medical Malpractice of Physicians?; 27 ST. MARY'S L.J. 23, 34 (1995) ("[A]pparent agency liability
should arise when a patient receives treatment in an HMO clinic and reasonably believes that the at-
tending physician is an employee or agent of the facility. In addition, if the facility, rather than the pa-
tient, selects the physician, courts should find that an apparent agency relationship exits. Finally, courts
should consider the billing method in applying the concept of apparent agency."); Mark G. Cooper,
Comment, A "New" Approach to Medical Malpractice: The Liability of HMOs for Member Physician
Negligence, 1994 DET. C.L. REV. 1263, 1288-90 (1994) (outlining factors that courts analyze when con-
sidering HMO liability under agency theories, including appearance conveyed to the enrollee by the
HMO; indications that the HMO exercises a "significant! level of control over the member physician;
HMO contract language indicating that all care must be "provided, arranged or authorized" by an HMO
physician, which conveys that HMO is responsible for delivery of the care; and method by which HMO
pays the physician, especially if it includes "capitation" disincentives for additional testing).
83 See, e.g., Pomeroy v. Johns Hopkins Med. Servs., 868 F. Supp. 110, 116 (D. Md. 1994) (holding
claims against HMO, including one based on "ostersible agency," preempted by ERISA and recogniz-
ing that such holding leaves plaintiff with no claim against defendant and possibly without any adequate
remedy at all); Raglin v. HMO Ill., Inc., 595 N.E.2d 153, 155 (11. App. Ct. 1992) (affirming summaryjudgment in favor of HMO defendant in claim based on apparent authority by finding that HMO did not
hold itself out as exerting control over its physicians in a manner that would lead a third person to con-
clude that physicians were employees of HMO, and that there was no evidence plaintiff relied on
HMO's representation in selecting physician just because plaintiff was required to, and did, choose from
list of physicians); Gugino v. Harvard Community Health Plan, 403 N.E.2d 1166 (Mass. 1980); Chase v.
Independent Practice Ass'n, 583 N.E.2d 251, 255 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (holding plaintiff's statement
that she was not made aware that her doctors were not employees of the HMO was insufficient to sup-
port her claim of ostensible agency because plaintiff failed to establish that she believed doctors were
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question of whether there is a duty on the part of an MCO to disclose com-
parative provider information independent of respondeat superior or appar-
ent authority theories. Numerous analogies in the law of torts support the
imposition of such a common law duty to disclose information critical to a
patient's health even in the absence of actual or apparent agency."
Employers, for example, frequently require prospective employees to
undergo physical examinations and blood tests. These examinations and
tests are performed solely for the benefit of the employer. Yet failure to
disclose findings about serious health dangers to the employee can result in
the imposition of liability on both the physician and the employer, even if
the physician was an independent contractor and thus not liable under re-
spondeat superior.s5 The rationale behind such a duty to disclose is that,
while an employer has no duty to provide a health examination for its em-
ployees, once it elects to do so an employee is entitled to rely "on the ex-
employees of the HMO); Williams v. Good Health Plus, Inc.-Health Amer. Corp., 743 S.W.2d 373, 378-
79 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (granting HMO's motion for summary judgment on claim of ostensible agency,
saying that HMO exercised no right of control over physicians that treated plaintiff). See also Dominick
C. DiCicco, Jr., HMO Liability for the Medical Negligence of Member Physicians, 43 VILL. L. REV.
499, 511-13 (1998) (noting Williams as the first case in which a court considered imposing liability on
an HMO for malpractice under ostensible agency theory).
94 The vast disparity of knowledge between the MCO and its member may suffice to create a duty to
disclose comparative provider information. See MARSHALL S. SHAPO, THE DUTY TO ACT: TORT LAW,
POWER & PUBLIC POLICY 3, 4, 13, 154 (1977) (establishing legal imposition of duty to act as arising
generally out of relationships where one party has power over the other and the "power holder already
has done something in a way that engenders reliance on the part of the injured party or has created a
generalized sense of security with reference to the [injured party's] physical integrity," and arguing that
duties arise specifically from medical relations because power is leveraged against the patient "owing to
his ignorance of medical knowledge generally and how it applies to the facts that have been developed
in his particular case"). In other areas of the law, disparity of knowledge often serves as a sufficient
predicate to disclose information. See, e.g., Miles v. McSwegin, 388 N.E.2d 1367, 1370 (Ohio 1979)
(finding real estate broker had duty to disclose known termite damage despite lack of "special relation-
ship between vendor's agent and vendee.. ."); Quashnock v. Frost, 299 Pa. Super. 9, 23 (1982); Obde v.
Schlemeyer, 353 P.2d 672, 674-75 (Wash. 1960) (holding home vendors had duty to speak where ter-
mite-infested house was "dangerous to property, health, or life of the tenant, which defects are known to
the landlord when the lease is made, but unknown to the tenant, and which a careful examination on his
part would not disclose .. .') (quoting Perkins v. Marsh, 37 P.2d 689, 690 (1934)). Similarly, securities
dealers have a duty to disclose information because of their superior access to information. See, e.g.,
Keenan v. D.H. Blair & Co., 838 F. Supp. 82, 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("a securities dealer must have an
adequate and reasonable basis in order to recommend a security, and must disclose facts of which he has
knowledge or that are easily ascertainable" (citing Hanly v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 415 F.2d 589,
597 (2d Cir. 1969))).
85 Union Carbide Carbon Corp. v. Stapleton, 237 F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1956) (employer that had its
medical staff take x-ray of employee for employment purposes had a duty to reveal diagnosis of tuber-
culosis to employee); Coffee v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 503 P.2d 1366 (Cal. 1972) (employer who
subjected pilot to pre-employment blood test had a duty to disclose results showing disease); Dormak v.
Lafayette Gen. Hosp., 399 So. 2d 168 (La. 1981) (hospital that subjected employee to pre-employment
x-ray had duty to disclose evidence of tuberculosis); Wojcik v. Aluminum Co. of America, 183
N.Y.S.2d 351 (Sup. Ct. 1959) (employer who subjected employees to x-rays had a common law duty to
disclose to employee finding of tuberculosis).
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pectation that he would be told of any dangerous condition actually dis-
closed by that examination.""6 A similar duty has also been held to apply to
an insurer who performs a health examination on an insured.7
We have demonstrated that comparative medical provider statistics can
reveal significant dangers to patients. By choosing a less competent over a
more proficient provider, a patient may substantially increase the risk of se-
rious medical injury or death. Just as an employer who possesses critical
health information about an employee has a duty to disclose that informa-
tion to the patient, MCOs that amass data of critical importance to the pa-
tient should have a similar duty to disclose. Indeed, the argument for
imposing a duty to disclose is much stronger in the case of the MCO. Not
only do patients have no reason to assume that physicians on an MCO list
are not of equal proficiency, but they have no way of gaining access to the
comparative provider data. Furthermore, by providing a list of in-network
physicians that patients must utilize exclusively, MCOs sharply limit the
patient's role in choosing among physicians. Even those plans that allow a
patient to choose a physician out-of-network do so only if the patient pays
more. In either case, the MCO creates substantial incentives for the patient
to use physicians that are enrolled in the plan. The MCO's exclusive con-
trol of information, heavy patient reliance on the judgment of the MCO in
choosing in-network physicians, and significant financial incentives to choose
in-network physicians who can reasonably be assumed to be fungible all
create a set of conditions that cry out for the recognition of a duty of the
MCO to disclose critical comparative provider information to its members.
Furthermore, courts have already imposed duties on MCOs to disclose
certain information to their customers. In Shea v. Esensten,88 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that an MCO violated its
fiduciary duty to disclose all material facts affecting the health care interests
of a participant in a health plan governed by ERISA, because the MCO
failed to inform the plan participant of an incentive structure which worked
to discourage patients from seeking providers out of the plan's physician
6 Stapleton, 237 F.2d at 232-33.
87 See Meinze v. Holmes, 532 N.E.2d 170, 173 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (insurer has a duty to disclose
to patient material information discovered by insurer's medical examiner). Courts are more reluctant to
impose a duty to disclose on life insurance companies who undertake routine health examinations prior
to issuing a policy. See Hannah E. Greenwald, Note, What You Don't Know Could Save Your Life: A
Case for FederalInsurance Disclosure Legislation, 102 DiCm. L. REv. 131 (1997).
88 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997). Recently a court has gone beyond requiring that an HMO inform
subscribers about possible conflicts in exercising their fiduciary responsibilities and has found that an
HMO that both owned and administered a health insurance plan breached its fiduciary duty when the
owner-physicians received a bonus from minimizing diagnostic tests and utilizing only their own hospi-
tal facilities. See Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 1998), reh'g denied, 170 F.3d 683, cert.
granted, No. 98-1949, 1999 WL 386669 (Sept. 28, 1999).
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network. 9 The court relied in part on its decision in Varity Corp. v. Howe,9°
in which the Eighth Circuit concluded that an ERISA fiduciary must com-
municate any material facts that could adversely affect a plan member's in-
terest." Surely, if a failure to disclose the existence of an MCO's incentive
structure constitutes breach of the common law duty of loyalty, so should a
failure to disclose provider statistics which are even more material to a pa-
tient's interests.
In our view, the argument for recognizing an informed consent duty of
disclosure for provider-specific information in the possession of MCOs is
strong. It is important, however, to indicate what we are not advocating.
We do not suggest that MCOs (or their providers) have a duty to independ-
ently collect information about nonaffiliated providers in order to compare
them with the MCO's providers. Nor do we suggest that an MCO (or other
provider) has a duty to analyze or process any raw data in its possession 2
We argue only that a provider or MCO that has risk information in a form
from which comparative inferences can be drawn-whether the MCO de-
veloped that information itself or obtained it from another source, such as
the government-has the same duty to disclose this information as it does
to disclose information about risks associated with the procedure.
B. ERISA Preemption
Once a common law duty to reveal provider statistics is imposed upon
MCOs, ERISA presents the last remaining obstacle to plaintiffs' recovery.
ERISA contains two provisions that ostensibly carve out the preempted
causes of action. First, there is -the civil enforcement provision, which pre-
empts any cause of action brought by a plan participant or beneficiary to re-
cover benefits due, enforce rights, or clarify future benefits under the plan.93
Second, there is the so-called "preemption clause," which supplants "all
state laws insofar as they .... relate to any employee benefit plan" covered
by the act.94 Despite this broadly restrictive language, courts are besieged
89 But see Weiss v. Cigna Healthcare, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 748, 755 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("ERISA im-
poses no affirmative obligation upon [an HMO] to inform plan participants about its financial arrange-
ments with participating physicians ...
90 36 F.3d 746 (1994), aff'd 515 U.S. 1186 (1995). See also Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S.
248, 262 (1993) ("ERISA, however, defines 'fiduciary' not in terms of formal trusteeship, but infunc-
tional terms of control and authority over the plan ... thus expanding the universe of persons subject to
fiduciary duties . )...'); Clifford A. Cantor, Fiduciary Liability in Emerging Health Care, 9 DEPAUL
Bus. L.J. 189 (1997).
91 See Shea, 107 F.3d at 628 (quoting Howe, 36 F.3d at 754).
92 Whether such a duty exists is beyond the scope of this Article.
9' 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1988). See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 66-67 (1987).
94 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
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by plaintiffs with state law claims against their MCOs who argue that
ERISA does not preempt their action. 5
The civil enforcement provision of ERISA allows a state cause of ac-
tion against an MCO to be automatically removed to federal court.9 Be-
cause remedies under the civil enforcement provision are only equitable in
nature, plan participants injured as a result of an MCO's wrongful denial of
benefits due under the plan are often left with no legal recourse.97 There
has, however, been a movement to interpret the nature of the civil enforce-
ment provision more narrowly. In Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare," plaintiffs
who were participants in an ERISA-governed health plan brought claims
alleging both vicarious liability of the MCO for medical malpractice of its
physicians and direct liability of the MCO itself for negligent selection, re-
tention, screening, monitoring, and evaluation of those physicians. In de-
termining whether a claim should fall under ERISA's civil enforcement
provision and thus trigger removal, the court focused on the distinction
between the quality of the health care provided and the quantity of benefits.
The Dukes court held that plaintiffs' claims were not completely preempted
because plaintiffs were not attempting to recover benefits or enforce or
clarify rights due under the ERISA-governed plan; rather, plaintiffs were
exercising their right to be "free from medical malpractice."
Even if a plan participant's cause of action is not subject to ERISA's
civil enforcement provision, it still must survive ERISA's preemption clause.
The "relates to" language of the preemption clause was interpreted by the
Supreme Court in the "normal sense of the phrase" to mean "in connection
with" or "with reference to" an ERISA-governed plan.t" Of course, any
imposition of liability under state tort law is bound to have some impact on
the financial health of the MCO and thus "relates to" an employee benefit
plan. However, in New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield
95 See Robert Pear, Hands 7Ted, Judges Rue Law That Limits HM.O. Liability, N.Y. TIMES, July 11,
1998, at Al.
96 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) (1988). See also Metropolitan Life, 481 U.S. at 66-67 (removal is auto-
matic notwithstanding the well-pleaded complaint rule because, ostensibly, the claim was to recover
benefits due, to enforce rights, or to clarify future benefits.).
97 See infra notes 102-03 and accompanying text
98 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995).
99 Id. at 357-58. Accord Crum v. Health Alliance-Midwest, Inc., 47 F. Supp. 2d 1013 (C.D. Ill.
1999) (claim based on nurse's misdiagnosis of heart attack over telephone not preempted); Moscovitch
v. Danbury Hosp., 25 F. Supp.2d 74 (D. Conn. 1998) (claim based on suicide of transferred psychiatric
patient not preempted).
1oo Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983). See also New York State Conference of
Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 656 (1995) (upholding the defini-
tion of "relates to" applied by the Delta court while simultaneously dismissing that language as "unhelp-
ful"). For an extensive discussion of the preemption doctrine see Peter D. Jacobson & Scott D. Pomfret,
Form, Function, and Managed Care Torts: Achieving Fairness and Equity in ERISA Jurisprudence, 35
HOUS. L. REV. 985 (1998). See also Larry J. Pitman, ERISA 's Preemption Clause and the Health Care
Industry: An Abdication ofJudicial Law-Creating Authority, 46 FLA. L. REv. 355 (1994).
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Plans v. Travelers,' the Court interpreted ERISA's preemption clause
more narrowly, holding that state laws with indirect economic effects on
ERISA plans are not necessarily preempted. The Court pointed out that
while things like quality control in hospitals and workplace regulations will
affect the cost of services to some extent, Congress clearly did not intend to
eviscerate such classic state regulation of health care."
Applying one or the other of these principles, the district courts are
split on whether ERISA preempts medical malpractice claims. 3 Several
leading circuit court cases have drawn a distinction between "utilization re-
view," in which an HMO denies benefits, and the liability of an HMO that
holds out a physician as its agent or is negligent in arranging for or super-
vising medical treatment. Preemption, they argue, applies only to utiliza-
tion review and not to common law negligence claims against an HIMO in
its role as principal or in its negligence in arranging for or supervising care.'0
101 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
102 See id. at 660-61. See also DeBuono v. NYSA-ILP Med. and Clinical Servs. Inc., 520 U.S. 806
(1997) (holding that state gross receipts of health care facilities operated in field generally regulated by
the states and was not preempted by ERISA). Accord Pappas v. Asbel, 724 A.2d 889, 893 (Pa. 1999)
(relying on the "Travelers line of cases" and holding negligence claim based on quadriplegia caused by
delay in hospital transfer for treatment not preempted, because decision to delay treatment involved
"provision of safe medical care").
103 See Pacificare of Okla., Inc. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151, 153 n.2 (10th Cir. 1995).
104 See id. at 155 (holding that malpractice claim against HMO that held out a doctor as its agent
"does not involve the administration of benefits or the level or quality of benefits promised by the plan"
but only negligent medical care, and thus the claim was not preempted); Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, 57
F.3d 350, 360 (3d Cir. 1995) (drawing distinction between "utilization review" and role of'HMO in "ar-
ranging for medical treatment."); Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637, 646 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that a claim
by a plan participant who sought damages for medical malpractice because he became handicapped after
treatment by the preferred provider of a PPO and an out-of-network referral physician was not a claim
"to enforce his rights under the terms of a plan that is within the scope of ERISA," and thus the claim
was not completely preempted under the civil enforcement provision). See also Nealy v. United States
Healthcare HMO, 711 N.E.2d 621 (N.Y. 1999). In that case, plaintiff's husband, who had a history of
heart problems, had consulted a primary care physician, Dr. Yung, under the U.S. Healthcare HMO and
asked for referral to an out-of-network cardiologist because he was suffering from renewed chest pain.
Dr. Yung delayed ten days in completing the necessary form. Further time passed and U.S. Healthcare
declined referral to an out-of-network cardiologist. By the time arrangements were made to see an in-
network cardiologist, the patient suffered a severe heart attack and died. Plaintiff brought an action
against U.S. Healthcare and Dr. Yung. The action against U.S. Healthcare was removed to federal court
and dismissed on the ground that it was preempted by ERISA. See Nealy v. United States Healthcare
HMO, 844 F. Supp. 966 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). Dr. Yung, who had not been served with a summons and
complaint, did not take part in the removal motion. The federal court remanded the case against him to
the New York State Supreme Court, stating that ERISA did not cut off malpractice claims against the
treating physician. The New York Court of Appeals rejected Dr. Yung's argument that his function in
failing to submit referral forms on a timely basis was an administrative function to be performed by a
physician under the plan and was thus barred under ERISA. The court found that the claim was one of
malpractice in failing to take timely action to treat the patient and was thus too peripheral to the benefit
plan to "relate to" the plan within the meaning of ERISA. Id. at 975.
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Absent legislative intervention," 5 the final arbiter as to the scope of
ERISA preemption will be the Supreme Court of the United States. Travel-
ers points to a less expansive reading of ERISA preemption. When the
plaintiff's claim concerns primary negligence in the delivery of medical
care by an MCO, the argument against preemption is especially strong. The
claim in Dukes that the defendant MCO was negligent in selection, reten-
tion, screening, and monitoring of physicians on its roster appears to be
closely analogous to the classic state regulation of hospitals through quality
control that Travelers finds not to be preempted. In light of Travelers and
Dukes, a claim for an MCO's failure to disclose comparative provider in-
formation should not be preempted. After all, such a claim is very much
akin to the regulation and monitoring of physicians. Indeed, the develop-
ment of comparative provider statistics by New York was undertaken in
1990 because the New York State Commissioner of Health believed that
peer review of the medical profession was not adequate to the task of ac-
complishing quality control. It was the Commissioner's view that public
availability of comparative provider statistics would be far more effective
than peer review in elevating the quality of medical care by both hospitals
and physicians."°e
It might be argued, though, that a duty of MCOs to inform their mem-
bers of the relative risks associated with their medical care providers would
be so onerous as to have a direct effect on benefit plans, and thus that this
duty should be preempted by ERISA under the Travelers principle. A duty
105 A Senate bill introduced last year aimed at amending ERISA to allow medical malpractice ac-
tions, S. 1136, noted "there is a split among the United States Courts of Appeals on whether ERISA pre-
empts medical malpractice suits against employer-sponsored health insurers," S. 1136, 105th Cong.
(1997). See also William E. Milks, Annotation, Liability of Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs)
for Negligence ofMember Physicians, 51 A.L.R1 5th 271 (1997); Corey J. Ayling, New Developments in
ERISA Preemption and Judicial Oversight ofManaged Care, 31 CREIGHToN L. REV. 403,415-20 (1998).
106 In 1990, Dr. David Axelrod, the New York State Commissioner of Health, met with the authors
of this Article to discuss his plan to make available to the public risk-adjusted mortality rates for open
heart surgery. In that meeting, Dr. Axelrod expressed the views set forth herein. Regrettably, shortly
after the release of the statistics to the public, Dr. Axelrod suffered a serious stroke and was totally inca-
pacitated until his death several years later.
The ineffectiveness of peer review is much discussed in the literature. See, eg., Mark R. Chassin,
Improving the Quality of Care (Quality of Health Care): Part 3, 335 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1060 (1996)
(reporting that physicians "may be forgiven if they are dubious" of a recent call by the HCFA and the
JCAHO for "a more cooperative effort to enhance quality" because physicians have "heard it before,"
"in the 1970s, [when] peer review was supposed to improve the quality of care," and in the 1980s with
"quality assurance," both of which left only a legacy of "punitive, sometimes humiliating sanctions" that
"make physicians' practicing lives difficult" but "rarely" deal with issues regarded as "important for pa-
tient care"); Henry A. Waxman, Medical Malpractice and Quality of Care, 316 NEw ENG. J. MED. 943,
944 (1987) ("Challenges to the value of peer review [are] based on evidence that it has often served the
self-interest of physicians or a hospital rather than the public interest. Witnesses at congressional hear-
ings described as common the practice of giving physicians known to be incompetent an assurance of
silence, or even a positive recommendation, in exchange for their resigning from the hospital or moving
out of town.).
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to disseminate information to patients admittedly goes well beyond the tra-
ditional duty to use reasonable methods to check and retain competent
medical personnel. These concerns notwithstanding, we find it unlikely
that MCOs will be afforded the immunity of ERISA preemption to shield
them from the consequences of failing to share with their members readily
available information about the risks associated with their providers. Once
a duty to disclose provider-specific information is firmly established, it will
be very difficult to argue that ERISA eviscerates this principle by allowing
the organizations with the greatest cache of such information to keep it se-
cret from its members.
It should be noted that current bills in Congress aimed at managed care
reform also address ERISA's preemptive power, and some would also re-
quire that certain types of risk data be disclosed. 7 While Republicans and
Democrats are most sharply divided over the right to sue MCOs, recent polls
indicate that managed care reform is an important issue to voters, making it
likely that some form of managed care reform legislation will be passed.0 8
VI. CONCLUSION
The availability and sophistication of provider-specific risk informa-
tion with respect to both hospitals and physicians is likely to continue
growing. The case for an informed consent cause of action when providers
do not share this information with their patients as part of the decision-
making process is compelling; indeed, as we have demonstrated, failure to
disclose this sort of information is much more likely to have an impact on a
patient's decision and ultimate welfare than failure to disclose procedure-
specific information. Thus, our proposal that this cause of action be recog-
nized stands on firmer conceptual ground than the well-accepted cause of
action for failure to disclose procedure-specific information.
Indeed, the case for recognizing a duty on the part of direct health care
providers to disclose provider-specific information is so strong that the
more intriguing questions relate to the operation of this duty in the context
107 The Democratic minority bill, H.R. 3605, and its companion Senate bill, S. 1890, both entitled
the "Patients' Bill of Rights Act of 1998," would amend Section 514 to allow state medical malpractice
actions against MCOs. Both would also require MCOs to collect "uniform quality data" that include,
among other things, data on quality indicators and health outcomes. H.R. 3605, 105th Cong. (1998); S.
1890, 105th Cong. (1998). Alternatively the House Republican leadership bill, H.R. 4250, as well as the
companion Senate bill, which was placed on the Senate calendar on July 29, 1998, would not amend
ERISA to allow state medical malpractice actions against MCOs. H.R. 4250 would allow for civil pen-
alties of up to $500 per day for the denial of medical care, plus costs including attorney's fees, if an
MCO receives an adverse judgment in federal court. These Republican proposals would also require
that a report by the Institutes of Medicine be submitted to the Secretary of Health and Human Services,
which would include, among other things, "recommendations for the disclosure of information on health
care professionals, including the competencies and professional qualifications of such practitioners, to
better facilitate patient choice, quality improvement, and market competition.' H.R. 4250, 105th Cong.
(1998); S. 4250, 105th Cong. (1998).108 See Robert Pear, Eye on Polls, G.O.P. Offers a Patients Bill, N.Y. TIMES, July 16,1998, at Al.
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of managed health care. MCOs that, unlike staff model HMOs, are not di-
rect health care providers, are (and will increasingly become) the reposito-
ries of significant comparative data about their affiliated physicians and
hospitals--data that the MCOs may not share with those physicians and
hospitals. We believe that courts will recognize a duty on the part of these
MCOs to share this risk information with their members and that ERISA
will not preempt this duty or its enforcement through tort law.
We recognize that our conclusions will engender controversy because
they may lead to significant changes in the delivery of health care. 09 Of
course, similar controversy engulfed the first revolution in informed con-
sent a generation ago. Yet, the medical profession eventually adapted to the
changes in practice that the revolution brought about. Not only can the
medical profession adapt to the more effective disclosures required in our
proposal, but there is much more reason to believe that these disclosures
will translate into patient benefits. We are confident that this second revo-
lution will be recognized as a positive development in the evolution of
modem health care.
109 Fora comprehensive discussion of the impact of the adoption of the authors' proposal, see Lynn
M. LoPucki, Twerski and Cohen's Second Revolution: A 4ystems/Strategic Perspective, 94 Nw. U. L.
REV. 55 (1999).
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APPENDIX A
New York State Department of Health,
Coronary Bypass Surgery in New York State 1994-1996 (1998)
1996 HOSPITAL RISK-ADJUSTED MORTALITY FOR CORONARY
BYPASS SURGERY
The table in Appendix A was published as Table 2 in New York State
Report. The table presents the 1996 CABG surgery results for the 32 hos-
pitals performing this operation in New York. The table contains, for each
hospital, the number of isolated CABG operations (CABG operations with
no other major heart surgery) resulting in 1996 discharges, the number of
in-hospital deaths, the observed mortality rate, the expected mortality rate
based on the statistical model presented in Table 1 of New York State Re-
port, the risk-adjusted mortality rate and a 95% confidence internal for the
risk-adjusted rate.
Definitions of key terms follow:
The OBSERVED MORTALITY RATE (OMR) is the number of observed
deaths divided by the total number of patients who underwent isolated
CABG surgery.
The EXPECTED MORTALITY RATE (EMR) is the sum of the predicted
probabilities of death for all patients divided by the total number of patients.
The RISK-ADJUSTED MORTALITY RATE (RAMR) is the best estimate,
based on the statistical model, of what the provider's mortality rate would
have been if the provider had a mix of patients identical to the statewide mix.
CONFIDENCE INTERVALS for the risk-adjusted mortality rate indicate
which hospitals had significantly more or fewer deaths than expected given
the risk factors of their patients. Hospitals with significantly higher rates
than expected after adjusting for risk are those with confidence intervals
entirely above the statewide rate. Hospitals with significantly lower rates
than expected given the severity of illness of their patients before surgery
have confidence intervals entirely below the statewide rate.
As indicated in table in Appendix A, the overall mortality rate for the
20,078 CABG operations performed at the 32 hospitals was 2.44%. Ob-
served mortality rates ranged from 0.86% to 6.38%. The range in expected
mortality rates, which measure patient severity of illness, was from 1.38%
to 3.45%.
The risk-adjusted mortality rates, which are used to measure perform-
ance, ranged from 1.10% to 5.93%. One hospital, St. Joseph's, had a risk-
adjusted mortality rate that was significantly lower than the statewide rate.
Three hospitals, St. Vincent's, St. Luke's-Roosevelt and Lenox Hill, had
significantly higher risk-adjusted rates than the statewide average.
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APPENDIX A: HosPrrAL OBSERVED, EXPECTED AND
RISK-ADJUSTED MORTALITY RATES (RAMR) FOR CABG
SURGERY IN NEW YoRK STATE, 1996 DISCHARGES
(LISTED ALPHABETICALLY By HosprrAL)
95% CI
Cases Deaths OMR EMR RAMR for RAMRHospital
Albany Medical Center
Arnot-Ogden
Bellevue
Beth Israel
Buffalo General
Ellis Hospital
Erie County
Lenox Hill
LI Medical Center
Maimonides
Millard Fillmore
Montefiore-Moses
Montefiore-Weiler
Mount Sinai
New York Hospital-Cornell
New York Hospital-Queens
NYU Hospitals Center
North Shore
Presbyterian
Rochester General
St. Francis
St. Joseph's
St. Luke's-Roosevelt
St. Peter's
St. Vicent's
Strong Memorial
United Health Serv.
Univ. Hosp. of Brooklyn
Univ. Hosp.-Stony Brook
Univ. Hosp.-Upstate
Westchester County
Wmthrop Univ. Hosp.
1136
135
94
428
1227
548
259
860
407
821
873
378
321
494
798
94
585
831
689
1007
1814
812
430
741
522
448
409
217
498
494
924
784
14 1.23 1.88 1.60 (0.87, 2.69)
6 4.44 1.83 5.93 (2.16, 12.90)
6 6.38 3.45 4.52 (1.65, 9.83)
7 1.64 2.35 1.70 (0.68, 3.50)
33 2.69 2.38 2.76 (1.90, 3.88)
9 1.64 1.78 2.25 (1.03, 4.27)
3 1.16 1.84 1.53 (0.31, 4.48)
32 3.72 2.49 3.64* (2.49, 5.14)
9 2.21 2.27 2.38 (1.08, 4.51)
28 3.41 2.91 2.86 (1.90, 4.14)
25 2.86 2.19 3.20 (2.07, 4.72)
14 3.70 2.27 3.97 (2.17, 6.67)
8 2.49 2.61 233 (1.00, 4.59)
14 2.83 2.83 2.45 (1.34, 4.10)
15 1.88 2.91 1.58 (0.88, 2.60)
1 1.06 1.38 1.88 (0.02, 10.46)
15 2.56 3.20 1.96 (1.09, 3.23)
15 1.81 2.62 1.68 (0.94, 2.77)
12 1.74 2.45 1.73 (0.89, 3.03)
35 3.48 3.10 2.74 (1.91, 3.81)
31 1.71 2.30 1.81 (1.23, 2.57)
7 0.86 1.91 1.10** (0.44, 2.27)
17 3.95 2.27 4.25* (2.48, 6.81)
13 1.75 1.93 2.22 (1.18, 3.80)
23 4.41 2.49 4.32* (2.74, 6.48)
18 4.02 2.69 3.64 (2.16, 5.75)
11 2.69 2.88 2.28 (1.14, 4.08)
8 3.69 3.00 3.00 (1.29, 5.91)
11 2.21 2.59 2.08 (1.04, 3.72)
12 2.43 2.38 2.50 (1.29, 4.36)
22 2.38 2.55 2.28 (1.43, 3.44)
16 2.04 2.38 2.09 (1.20, 3.40)
Total 20078 490 2.44
* Risk-adjusted mortality rate significantly higher than statewide rate based on 95 percent
confidence interval.
** Risk-adjusted mortality rate significantly lower than statewide rate based on 95 percent
confidence interval.
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APPENDIX B
New York State Department of Health,
Angioplasty in New York State 1995 (1997)
1995 HOSPITAL RISK-ADJUSTED MORTALITY FOR ANGIOPLASTY
The table in Appendix B was published as Table 3 in New York State
Angioplasty. The table presents the 1995 angioplasty mortality results for
the 32 hospitals performing angioplasty in New York in 1995. The table
contains, for each hospital, the number of angioplasties resulting in 1995
discharges, the number of in-hospital deaths, the observed mortality rate,
the expected mortality rate based on the statistical model presented in Table
1 of New York State Angioplasty, the risk-adjusted mortality rate and a 95
percent confidence interval for the risk-adjusted rate. Also, it contains each
hospital's risk-adjusted mortality rate for elective patients. Nonelective pa-
tients are defined to be patients in shock, a state of hemodynamic instability
(very blow blood pressure) or patients who experienced a heart attack
within 24 hours prior to undergoing angioplasty. The hospital risk-adjusted
rates for elective angioplasty patients are provided because many studies are
confined to this group of patients, and because these patients comprise the
majority of all angioplasty patients (92.1% in 1995).
Definitions of key terms are as follows:
The OBSERVED MORTALITY RATE (OMR) is the number of in-hospital
deaths divided by the number of patients.
The EXPECTED MORTALITY RATE (EMR) is the sum of the predicted
probabilities of death for all patients divided by the total number of patients.
The RISK-ADJUSTED MORTALITY RATE (RAMR) is the best estimate,
based on the statistical model, of what the provider's mortality rate would
have been if the provider had a mix of patients similar to the statewide
mortality rate (0.89% for all angioplasty patients).
CONFIDENCE INTERVALS indicate which hospitals had significantly
more or fewer deaths than expected given the risk factors of their patients.
Hospitals with significantly higher rates than expected after adjusting for
risk are those with confidence intervals entirely above the statewide rate.
Hospitals with significantly lower rates than expected given the severity of
illness of their patients before the angioplasty have confidence intervals en-
tirely below the statewide rate.
The overall mortality rate for the 21,707 angioplasties performed at the
32 hospitals was 0.89 percent. Observed mortality rates ranged from 0.00
percent to 2.39 percent. The range in expected mortality rates, which
measure patient severity of illness, was between 0.44 percent to 1.86 per-
cent. Based on confidence intervals for risk-adjusted rates, no hospital had
a significantly higher risk-adjusted mortality rate than the statewide rate.
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One hospital, St. Francis, had a significantly lower risk-adjusted mortality
rate than the statewide rate.
The last column of the table in Appendix B presents the hospital risk-
adjusted mortality rates for elective cases only (based on the statistical
model presented in Table 2 of New York State Angioplasty). As presented
in the last row, the statewide mortality rate for elective cases is 0.43 per-
cent, which is comparable to rates reported in the literature for these cases.
The range of risk-adjusted rates was from 0.00 percent to 2.43 percent. One
hospital, Arnot-Ogden, had a significantly higher risk-adjusted mortality
rate than the statewide rate. No hospitals had a significantly lower risk-
adjusted mortality rate than the statewide rate.
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APPENDIX B: HosPrrAL OBSERVED, EXPECTED AND
RIsK-ADUSTTED MORTALrIY RATES (RAMR) FOR ANGIOPLASTY
IN NEw YoRK STATE-1995 DIscAR1OES
Elective
All Cases Cases
Cases Deaths OMR EMR RAMR 95% CI RAMR
Albany Medical Center
Arnot-Ogden
Bellevue
Beth Israel
Buffalo General
Crouse-Irving
Ellis Hospital
Erie County
Lenox Hill
LIJ Medical Center
Maimonides
Millard Fillmore
Monteflore-Moses
Monteflore-Weiler
Mount Sinai
New York Hospital-Cornell
NYU Medical Center
North Shore
Presbyterian
Rochester General
St. Francis
St. Joseph's
St. Luke's/Roosevelt
St. Peter's
.St. Vincent's
Strong Memorial
United Health Services
Univ. Hosp. of Brooklyn
Univ. Hosp.-Stony Brook
Upstate Medical Center
Westchester County
Winthrop Univ. Hosp.
Total
0.62 1.61
1.26 1.69
0.83 0.00
0.62 1.86
0.44 0.00
0.47 0.78
0.58 0.86
0.48 1.40
1.09 1.31
0.70 1.55
0.76 0.78
1.04 0.79
1.24 0.43
1.10 1.86
1.01 1.34
0.90 0.89
1.11 0.94
0.91 0.54
1.53 0.55
0.92 0.78
0.94 0.40**
0.85 0.97
0.82 0.76
0.73 0.47
0.50 1.30
1.38 1.51
1.05 0.55
0.61 1.17
0.67 0.78
1.07 1.50
1.03 0.68
0.90 0.92
(0.65, 3.32) 0.81
(0.62, 3.68) 2.43*
(0.00, 2.92) 0.00
(0.60, 4.34) 0.81
(0.00, 1.45) 0.00
(0.09, 2.82) 0.00
(0.10, 3.09) 0.47
(0.02, 7.81) 0.00
(0.84, 1.95) 0.44
(0.50, 3.61) 0.95
(029, 1.70) 027
(029, 1.71) 022
(0.05, 1.54) 0.00
,(0.89, 3.43) 1.30
(0.75, 2.1) 0.55
(0.32, 1.93) 0.48
(0.34, 2.04) 0.60
(0.23, 1.06) 027
(0.15, 1.40) 0.32
(0.40, 1.36) 0.31
(0.18, 0.77) 0.18
(0.47, 1.79) 0.35
(0.15, 2.23) 029
(0.10, 1.39) 0.62
(0.47, 2.83) 0.58
(0.69, 2.86) 0.00
(0.15, 1.40) 0.25
(0.13, 424) 1.13
(0.16, 2.27) 0.57
(0.17, 5.40) 0.00
(0.29, 1.33) 0.59
(0.39, 1.81) 0.66
21707 194 0.89 0.89 0.89
* Risk-adjusted mortality rate significantly higher than statewide rate.
**Risk-adjusted mortality rate significantly lower than statewide rate.
OMR - observed mortality rate
EMR - expected mortality rate
RAMR - risk adjusted mortality rate
CI - confidence interval
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APPENDIX C
OBSERVED, EXPECTED AND RISK-ADJUSTED HOSPITAL AND
SURGEON + IN-HOSPITAL MORTALITY RATES FOR
CABG SURGERY IN NEW YORK STATE IN 1994-96
The table in Appendix C was published as Table 3 in New York State
Report. This table provides the number of isolated CABG operations,
number of CABG patients who died in the hospital, observed mortality
rate, expected mortality rate, risk-adjusted mortality rate and the 95%
confidence interval for the risk-adjusted mortality rate for 1994-96 for
each of the 32 hospitals performing CABG surgery during the time period.
Cases No. of OMR EMR RAMR 95% CI
Deaths for RAMR
Albany Medical
Center Hospital
1#  600 5 0.83 1.75 1.18 (0.38, 2.76)
2 528 14 2.65 2.42 2.71 (1.A8,4.55)
Total 3466 53 1.53 2.04 1.86** (1.40,2.44)
Arnot-Ogden Medical
Center
3 157 3 1.91 2.55 1.86 (0.37,5.43)
4 260 8 3.08 2.36 3.23 (1.39, 6.37)
Total 570 13 2.28 2.49 2.27 (1.21,3.88)
Bellevue Hospital
Center
5# 114 4 3.51 2.04 4.27 (1.15, 10.93)
6#  78 2 2.56 2.24 2.84 (0.32, 10.26)
Total 290 17 5.86 2.35 6.19* (3.61,9.92)
Beth Israel Medical
Center
7 147 1 0.68 1.72 0.98 (0.01,5.45)
8 772 17 2.20 2.66 2.05 (1.20,3.29)
Total 1053 19 1.80 2.52 1.78 (1.07, 2.77)
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Buffalo General
Hospital
9 723 10 1.38 2.31 1.49 (0.71,2.73)
10 643 14 2.18 1.94 2.79 (1.52,4.68)
Total 3631 93 2.56 2.32 2.74 (2.21,3.36)
Ellis Hospital
11 444 7 1.58 2.11 1.85 (0.74, 3.82)
12" 526 10 1.90 1.64 2.87 (1.37,5.28)
Total 1457 22 1.51 1.86 2.01 (1.26, 3.05)
Erie County Medical
Center
13" 636 8 1.26 1.74 1.79 (0.77,3.53)
14" 2 0 0.00 5.26 0.00 (0.00, 86.40)
Total 638 8 1.25 1.75 1.78 (0.76,3.50)
Lenox ilHospital
15' 353 11 3.12 2.38 3.24 (1.62,5.80)
16 1285 52 4.05 2.68 3.75* (2.80,4.92)
Total 2208 81 3.67 2.56 3.55* (2.82, 4.41)
Long Island Jewish
Medical Center
17 562 12 2.14 2.07 2.56 (1.32, 4.47)
18 454 8 1.76 2.18 2.01 (0.86, 3.95)
Total 1210 24 1.98 2.12 2.32 (1.48, 3.45)
Maimonides Medical
Center
19" 370 16 4.32 2.42 4.43* (2.53, 7.19)
20 1133 33 2.91 3.18 2.27 (1.56, 3.19)
Total 2504 86 3.43 3.01 2.83 (2.26,3.50)
Millard Fillmore
Hospital
21 542 15 2.77 2.21 3.10 (1.73, 5.12)
22" 591 19 3.21 2.18 3.65 (2.20, 5.70)
Total 2240 75 3.35 2.13 3.90* (3.07, 4.89)
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Monteftore Medical
Center, Moses
Division
23 394 12 3.05 1.87 4.05 (2.09,7.07)
24 308 6 1.95 1.42 3A1 (1.25, 7.43)
Total 1181 36 3.05 1.76 4.29 (3.01,5.95)
Montefiore Medical
Center, Weler
Division
25' 410 7 1.71 2.16 1.96 (0.78, 4.03)
26 373 15 4.02 3.02 3.31 (1.85,5.46)
Total 923 25 2.71 2.44 2.76 (1.78,4.07)
Mount Sinai Hospital
27 528 8 1.52 2.89 1.30 (0.56,2.57)
28 441 21 4.76 3.59 3.29 (2.03,5.03)
Total 1518 51 3.36 3.36 2.48 (1.85,3.27)
New York Hospital -
Cornell
29 774 15 1.94 2.54 1.89 (1.06,3.12)
30 706 19 2.69 2.94 2.27 (1.37,3.55)
Total 2670 63 2.36 2.78 2.11 (1.62,2.69)
New York Hospital-
Queens
31' 70 0 0.00 1.48 0.00 (0.00,8.75)
32' 3 0 0.00 1.32 0.00 (0.00, 100.0)
Total 94 1 1.06 1.47 1.79 (0.02,9.95).
NYU Hosp Itals
Center
33 401 3 0.75 2.64 0.70** (0.14,2.05)
34 2.94 6 2.04 3.52 1.44 (0.52,3.13)
Total 1859 61 3.38 3.35 2.43 (1.86, 3.12)
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North Shore Univer-
sity Hospital
35 796 9 1.13 2.53 1.11** (0.51,2.11)
36 579 12 2.07 2.29 2.24 (1.16, 3.91)
Total 2082 34 1.63 2.33 1.74 (1.21,2.43)
Presbyterian Hospital
- City of New York
37 424 13 3.07 2.88 2.64 (1.40, 4.51)
38 654 10 1.53 2.57 1A8 (0.71,2.71)
Total 1873 41 2.19 2.46 2.21 (1.58, 2.99)
Rochester General
Hospital
39 863 29 3.36 3.55 2.35 (1.57, 3.37)
40 969 25 2.58 2.80 2.28 (1.48, 3.37)
Total 3066 97 3.16 2.93 2.68 (2.17, 3.27)
St. Francis Hospital
41 919 16 1.74 2.15 2.01 (1.15, 3.26)
42 1079 17 1.58 2.51 1.56 (0.91, 2.49)
Total 5123 89 1.71 2.44 1.74** (1.40, 2.15)
St Joseph S Hospital
Health Center
43 621 10 1.61 2.30 1.73 (0.83, 3.19)
44 639 7 1.10 2.75 0.99** (0.40, 2.04)
Total 2334 21 0.90 2.20 1.01* (0.63, 1.55)
St. Luke SRoosevelt
Hospital- St Lukes
Division
45 545 11 2.02 1.75 2.86 (1.43, 5.12)
46 422 13 3.08 3.09 2.47 (1.31, 4.22)
Total 1399 44 3.15 2.28 3.42* (2.48, 4.59)
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St. PeterS Hospital
470 570 10 1.75 2.05 2.12 (1.01, 3.90)
48" 610 6 0.98 1,94 1.26 (0.46, 2.74)
Total 1981 34 1.72 2.17 1.97 (1.36, 2.75)
St. Vwcents Hospital
and Medical Center
49 558 9 1.61 3.66 1.09"* (0.50, 2.08)
50 541 18 3.33 2.14 3.85 (2.28, 6.08)
Total 1656 56 3.38 2.76 3.04 (2.30, 3.95)
Strong Memorial
Hospital
51 631 17 2.69 2.79 2.39 (1.39, 3.83)
52 641 21 3.28 2.19 3.72 (2.30, 5.68)
Total 1278 39 3.05 2.49 3.03 (2.16, 4.15)
United Health
Services - Widson Di-
vision
53 393 7 1.78 2.50 1.77 (0.71, 3.64)
54 397 11 2.77 3.07 2.24 (1.12, 4.01)
Total 1173 28 2.39 2.69 2.20 (1.46, 3.18)
University Hospital of
Brooklyn
550 153 6 3.92 2.88 3.37 (1.23, 7.34)
560 340 10 2.94 2.67 2.73 (1.31, 5.02)
Total 709 23 3.24 2.75 2.93 (1.86, 4.39)
University Hospital
(Stony Brook)
570 431 4 0.93 2.21 1.04 (0.28, 2.66)
58 373 8 2.14 2.56 2.08 (0.90, 4.10)
Total 1457 32 2.20 2.66 2.05 (1.40, 2.89)
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University Hospital
Upstate Medical
Center
59 311 8 2.57 1.86 3.43 (1.48, 6.76)
60 342 8 2.34 1.73 3.36 (1.45, 6.62)
Total 1304 33 2.53 1.81 3.47 (2.39, 4.87)
Westchester County
Medical Center
61 493 10 2.03 2.09 2A0 (1.15, 4.42)
62 427 4 0.94 2.83 0.82** (0.22, 2.10)
Total 2456 70 2.85 2.52 2.81 (2.19, 3.55)
Winthrop - University
Hospital
63 421 8 1.90 2.18 2.17 (0.93, 4.27)
64 505 13 2.57 2.77 2.30 (1.22, 3.94)
Total 1939 55 2.84 2.88 2.44 (1.84, 3.18)
+ Condensed to show only the two surgeons at each hospital who performed the greatest
number of procedures. Each surgeon is referred to by number.
* Risk-adjusted mortality rate is significantly higher than statewide rate.
** Risk-adjusted mortality rate is significantly lower than statewide rate.
# Performed operations in another New York State hospital.
Performed operations in two or more other New York State hospitals.
OMR = the observed mortality rate is the number of observed deaths divided by the number of patients.
EMR = the expected mortality rate is the sum of the predicted probabilities of death for each patient
divided by the total number of patients.
RAMR = the risk-adjusted mortality rate is the best estimate, based on the statistical model, of what
the provider's mortality rate would have been if the provider had a mix of patients identical to the state-
wide mix. It is computed as the quotient of the OMR and the EMR (OMRiEMR) multiplied by the
statewide mortality rate for the time period.
